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"Closet Case": Boy Scouts ofAmerica v
Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian,
Bisexual, and Transgender Invisibility
Darren Lenard Hutchinson*
This Article argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale
misapplies and ignores controlling First Amendment precedent and incorrectly defines "sexual
identity" as a clinical or biological imposition that exists apart from expression or speech. This
Article provides a doctrinal alternative to Dale that would protect vital interests in both equality
and liberty and that would not condition, as does Dale, sexual "equality" upon the silencing of
gay lesbian, bisexual, and tansgender individuals.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's closely divided decision in Boy Scouts of
America v Dale holds that the First Amendment right of "expressive
association" permits the Boy Scouts of America (Boy Scouts) to
exclude gays and lesbians from its membership.' The Court thus rules
1. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000). I am deeply connected to the facts and legal issues of
this case, having represented James Dale, pro bono, in my capacity as an Associate at Cleary,
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that application of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(NJLAD)-which bans, among other things, discrimination on the
basis of "sexual or affectional orientation" in places of public
accommodation 2 -would infringe upon the organization's constitu-
tional liberties.3
To reach these conclusions, the decision finds that the Boy
Scouts' expressive activities include the condemnation of
homosexuality The Court also holds that the forced inclusion of
openly gay and lesbian people-not simply individuals who are gay and
lesbian-in the Boy Scouts would frustrate the organization's
expressive activities Faced with minimal evidence-evidence that the
New Jersey Supreme Court,6 a New Jersey appellate panel,7 and four
dissenting justices viewed as unpersuasive-to support the Boy
Scouts' defense under existing precedent, the Court, for the first time,
holds that it must give "deference" to both a discriminator's allegations
as to the content of its expressive activities and to a discriminator's
assertion that the forced inclusion of an unwanted class would
complicate these expressive goals.' The Court also draws a distinction
between gay and lesbian status and public expressions of sexual
identity. ° The Court concludes that the First Amendment permits the
Gottlieb, Steen, and Hamilton in New York City. The views expressed in this Article are mine
alone.
2. The NJLAD provides:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment, and to obtain
all the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of any place of public
accommodation, publicly assisted housing accommodation, and other real property
without discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age,
marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, familial status, or sex, subject only
to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all persons. This opportunity is
recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:54 (West Supp. 2001).
3. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649.
4. Id. at 648-53.
5. Id. at 653-56.
6. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1223-25 (N.J. 1999), rev't 530 U.S.
640 (2000).
7. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 290-93 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div.
1998), aff', 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (rejecting Boy Scouts'
First Amendment defense of its antigay discrimination).
8. Dale, 530 U.S. at 663 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id at 700 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 651-53 ("As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the
nature of its expression, we must also give deference to an association's view of what would
impair its expression:).
10. Id at 653-54.
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Boy Scouts to discriminate on the basis of the latter, but not the former
alone."
Finally, the Court rejects arguments that application of the
NJLAD to the Boy Scouts furthers a compelling interest and thus
could withstand strict judicial scrutiny.'2 While the Court does not
decide whether state civil rights statutes that prohibit sexual orientation
discrimination generally advance compelling state interests in the First
Amendment context, the Court, nevertheless, finds that application of
the statute in this case constitutes an unjustifiable, "severe intrusion"
into the Boy Scouts' speech interests." Consequently, Dale reverses a
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court which holds that the First
Amendment could not shield the Boy Scouts' antigay discrimination.'4
Dale is important for several reasons. First, it is one of only four
cases in which the Court has analyzed either claims of discrimination
or privacy infringement brought by gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transgender individuals.' The case also has vital implications for First
Amendment doctrine'6 and for the broader context of civil rights
enforcement and equality politics. 7 The opinion is most striking,
11. The Court rules:
That is not to say that an expressive association can erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member
from a particular group would impair its message. But here Dale, by his own
admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who have "become leaders in their
community and are open and honest about their sexual orientation:'
Id at 653.
12. Id. at 656-59.
13. Id at 659 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations
law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association.').
14. Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999), rev'd 530 U.S. 640
(2000).
15. See Dale, 530 US. at 659 (holding that enforcement of state civil rights statute to
preclude antigay discrimination would infringe upon defendant's right of expressive
association); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (holding that state constitutional
amendment banning implementation of laws prohibiting antigay discrimination violated
equal protection); Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557,
572-81 (1995) (holding that forced inclusion of contingent of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in
parade through civil rights enforcement would impermissibly dictate the content of parade
organizers' speech); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 US. 186, 189-91 (1986) (holding that there is
no fundamental right to engage in "homosexual sodomy").
16. John C. O'Quinn, Recent Development, "How Solemn Is the Duty ofthe Mighty
Chief". Mediating the Conflict of Rights in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000), 24 HAP v. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 319, 321 (2000) (arguing that Dale "provided an
opportunity not only to delineate the meaning of the right of intimate association, but also to
forge greater consensus generally on the protections afforded by the freedoms of speech and
association").
17. See inlin Parts 11-I1.
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however, for the important issues that it "closets" or reduces to
invisibility. In particular, the Court obscures and evades elements of
First Amendment jurisprudence that should have controlled its
decision.' ' The doctrinal framework governing cases that involve
alleged conflicts between the application of antidiscrimination laws
and a discriminator's right of expressive association appears in a trilogy
of cases beginning with Roberts v United States Jaycees.'9 In these
cases, the Court rigorously analyzed the organization's expressive
association defenses, requiring solid evidence to establish that an
institution's discrimination related to a clearly defined and articulable
speech interest." In Dale, however, the Court cites to, yet departs
from, the careful Roberts doctrine and announces a "deference"
standard for discriminators.' The closeting of Roberts in Dale leaves
the Court's analysis incomplete and unprincipled and also signals the
inevitable defeat of James Dale's complaint."
Additionally, Dale fails to examine the particularities of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identities and of social identity
generally. Specifically, Dale ignores the expressive nature of these
identity categories.' Consideration of the expressive quality of social
identity would have complicated the Court's conclusion that Dale's
outness, rather than his gay status, legitimizes the Boy Scouts'
expressive association defense. Under a proper understanding of the
socially constructed nature of identity, speech and identity are not as
neatly separable as the Court's simplistic analysis presumes. 4 On the
18. See infra Part ll.C.
19. 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (denying defendants' expressive association defense to
application of public accommodations law); see also Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987) (same); N.Y State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988) (rejecting plaintiff's claim that public accommodations law on its face
infringed upon right of expressive association).
20. See infia Part ll.B.
21. See infra Part I.C.
22. See infra notes 230-232 and accompanying text.
23. See infla Part III.A-B. For a sampling of scholarship on social constructivist and
expressive theories of identity, see generally JuDrrH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM
AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1990); Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics
of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv 503, 503-68
(1994); Nan D. Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for Equality, 35 HARv
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 4-17 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness:
Hurley, Free Speech, and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U PA. 3. CONST. L. 85, 116-23 (1998);
Ian E Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion,
Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv 1, 54-62 (1994).
24. See Hunter, supra note 23, at 1-2 ("In our political life, identity politics is
interwoven with dissent-is understood as dissent.... By expressive identity, I mean those
2001]
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contrary, speech, expression, and action shape and build social identity,
and social identity is active and expressive, rather than static and
clinical."
Finally, Dale conceals the Court's disagreement with the Roberts
doctrine, which established an "equality-sensitive,' yet balanced,
framework for determining whether civil rights enforcement
unconstitutionally impedes the speech interests of discriminating
membership organizations and places of public accommodation."
Dale also masks judicial animosity toward, and intolerance of, gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality efforts.27 Several members
of the Dale majority, in particular Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, have fervently voiced their disapproval of even
minimal constitutional protection for gays and lesbians." Yet, the Dale
majority asserts that the legal, social, and political contest over gay and
lesbian equality does not influence its decision."9 Furthermore, Dale
joins Hurley v Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston' as recent cases that imply a withering of the Roberts
standard.' In those cases, both of which involve the litigation of gay,
lesbian, and bisexual equality claims, the Court has neither honestly
applied nor expressly overruled the central components of Roberts.
Although Hurley is somewhat distinct from Dale because the former
involves pure "free speech;' rather than expressive association, the
Hurley court, nevertheless, attempts to place its lenient analysis within
the Roberts line of cases.2 Thus, the Court has seemingly reworked
situations of particularly strong intersection, where an identity characteristic itself is
understood to convey a message!).
25. Id.; see also Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 116-23; infm Part llI.B.
26. See infia Part IVA.
27. See infra Part IVB.
28. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This
Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by the elite class
from which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that 'animosity' toward
homosexuality is evil. I vigorously dissent") (internal citation omitted); Equal. Found. v. City
of Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Unelected heads of city
departments and agencies, who are in other respects (as democratic theory requires) subject
to the control of the people, must, where special protection for homosexuals [is] concerned,
be permitted to do what they please"). Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas joined
Justice Scalia in both opinions.
29. Dale, 530 U.S. at 661 ('We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of
whether the Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or
wrong... ')-
30. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
31. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 102-103 (analyzing the doctrinal distinctions
between Hurley and Roberts).
32. See in&ra note 222 and accompanying text.
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the Roberts doctrine but has not done so explicitly and openly3
Alternatively, the Court might be carving out a separate expressive
association doctrine in the context of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender litigation. Even if the latter explanation were correct, the
Court still has not articulated a principle to justify such a reworking of
Roberts in the particular context of homophobic discrimination.
Furthermore, if the Court is in fact developing a deferential standard
for reviewing expressive association defenses exclusively in the
context of heterosexist discrimination cases, then its doctrine clearly
subordinates gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people because it
unjustifiably expands the scope of permissible homophobic
discrimination.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II discusses the evolution
of the right of expressive association and examines the constitutional
test, developed in the Roberts line of cases, used to analyze purported
conflicts between associational freedoms and governmental civil rights
enforcement. Part II then uncovers the Court's closeting of Roberts in
Dale by examining how Dale materially, yet quietly, departs from the
Roberts framework. Part III criticizes the Court's failure to
acknowledge the expressive nature of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender identity specifically, and, more broadly, the expressive and
active components of all forms of social identity. Part llI also
demonstrates how the Court's dichotomizing of speech and identity
constricts the reach of equality doctrine. Part IV analyzes the Court's
obfuscation of its apparent disagreement with the fundamentals of the
Roberts doctrine and its insensitivity toward antiheterosexist equality
efforts. Part V makes suggestions for redirecting First Amendment
jurisprudence away from conditioning gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender equality upon the invisibility of sexual minorities and
toward a jurisprudence that "accommodates outness."'34 Specifically,
Part V argues that the Roberts doctrine provides a more balanced
treatment of the sometimes competing interests of equality and speech.
Accordingly, only a return to the more "substantial" analysis of the
expressive association defenses that the Court used in Roberts can
ensure that equality is only sacrificed in order to protect true speech
goals. Part V then considers how the outcome of Dale would have
differed under a more substantial-and honest-evidentiary analysis.
Finally, Part V urges the Court to recognize the speech dimensions of
33. See infi-a Part IVA.
34. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 123-25 (advocating development of a First
Amendment and equality jurisprudence that "accommodates outness").
2001]
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gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identity and to discard its
archaic understanding of identity as a fixed or clinical quantity-a
conceptualization that contradictorily conditions "equality" on the
silencing of sexually oppressed classes.
I. THE CLOSETING OF THE ROBERTS DOCTRINE
A. Who Is James Dale?
James Dale joined the Monmouth, New Jersey, branch of the Boy
Scouts as a youth member and maintained his membership throughout
his childhood and as a young adult." Dale was a dedicated member of
the Boy Scouts, and he achieved several honors, including the group's
highest recognition, the award of Eagle Scout. 6 In 1989, the Boy
Scouts invited Dale to serve as an adult leader in the organization, and
he accepted a position as an Assistant Scoutmaster."
Shortly thereafter, Dale enrolled in Rutgers University." At
Rutgers, Dale began to acknowledge to himself and to others that he
was a gay male; he subsequently joined and became copresident of a
campus group for gay, lesbian, and bisexual students." In 1990, Dale
attended a campus panel on gay and lesbian youth issues." A local
newspaper published a story on the panel and printed a photograph of
Dale; the caption identified Dale as copresident of the gay and lesbian
student group.4 Days later, Dale received a letter from his local troop
that revoked his membership in the Boy Scouts 2 and instructed him to
35. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
36. Id. ("By all accounts, Dale was an exemplary Scout. In 1988, he achieved the
rank of Eagle Scout, one of Scouting's highest honors.").
37. Id. ("Dale applied for adult membership in the Boy Scouts in 1989. The Boy
Scouts approved his application for the position of assistant scoutmaster of Troop 73:').
38. Id. ("Around the same time [that he accepted the Assistant Scoutmaster position],
Dale left home to attend Rutgers University.").
39. Id. at 644-45 ("After arriving at Rutgers, Dale first acknowledged to himself and
others that he is gay. He quickly became involved with, and eventually became the
copresident of, the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance").
40. Id. at 645 ("In 1990, Dale attended a seminar addressing the psychological and
health needs of lesbian and gay teenagers.").
41. Id. ("A newspaper coveing the event interviewed Dale about his advocacy of
homosexual teenagers' need for gay role models. In early July 1990, the newspaper published
the interview and Dale's photograph over a caption identifying him as the copresident of the
Lesbian/Gay Alliance").
42. Id. ("Later that month, Dale received a letter from Monmouth Council Executive
James Kay revoking his adult membership.").
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"sever any relations [he] may have with Boy Scouts of America" '
After Dale inquired as to the basis for his expulsion from the Boy
Scouts, the organization explained by letter that it "specifically
forbid[s] membership to homosexuals. " In 1992, Dale filed a lawsuit
against the Boy Scouts that alleged several state law causes of action,
including a claim that the Boy Scouts' revocation of his membership
violated the NJLAD, which expressly prohibits discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation in places of public accommodation.45
The Boy Scouts did not contest the material facts alleged in
Dale's complaint.46 Instead, the organization argued that application of
the NJLAD would infringe upon its First Amendment right of
"expressive association" because the association disapproves of
"homosexuality" and because the forced admission of an "avowed
homosexual" would impair its purportedly heterosexist expression. 7
The expressive association defense ultimately proved central to the
43. See Respondent's Brief, Boy Scouts ofnAm. v. Dale, 530 US. 640 (2000) (No. 99-
699), available at 2000 WL 340276, at *6-*7 (Mar. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Respondent's
Brief].
44. Dale, 530 US. at 645.
45. Id. (describing causes of action Dale brought against the Boy Scouts).
46. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 277 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998),
aff'd, 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd 530 US. 640 (2000) (noting that both parties filed
motions for summary judgment in the trial court and that the parties concede that there are
"no genuine issues of material facts").
47. The Petitioner's Brief, submitted to the United States Supreme Court, argues:
[The] Boy Scouts believes that homosexual conduct is not 'morally straight' under
the Scout Oath and not 'clean' under Scout Law. Consequently, known or avowed
homosexual persons or any persons who advocate to Scouting youth that
homosexual conduct is 'morally straight' under the Scout Oath, or 'clean' under the
Scout Law will not be registered as adult leaders.
Petitioner's Brief, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at
2000 WL 228616, at *27 (Feb. 28, 2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
The evidence in the record indicates that the Boy Scouts was not truthful with respect to its
allegation that "any persons" who advocate the morality of "homosexual conduct" will not be
registered as adult leaders. As Dale, in his Supreme Court brief, argued:
Indeed, perhaps the clearest indication that identity-based discrimination, rather
than a burden on any actual Scouting message, is at issue here is that non-gay
members are not expelled or even asked to refrain openly from sharing their views
that the policy [condemning or excluding homosexuals] is wrong or that gay
people are appropriate moral role models.
See Respondent's Brief, supra note 43, at *29. The record contained no evidence that any
heterosexual had been expelled from the Boy Scouts despite taking public positions
supportive of gays and lesbians. See infra notes 210-214 and accompanying text. The Boy
Scouts raised other defenses that are not relevant to this Article or to the Dale decision.
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litigation." The state trial court granted summary judgment to the Boy
Scouts on statutory grounds as the trial court found that the Boy
Scouts was not a "place of public accommodation."' The court held,
alternatively, that the First Amendment precluded application of the
NJLAD to the Boy Scouts so as to prevent reinstatement of James
Dale's membership." An appellate panel reversed this decision and
rejected the Boy Scouts' expressive association defense,' and the New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the decision of that panel. 2 Because
the New Jersey Supreme Court construed the state civil rights statute
as applicable to the Boy Scouts, 3 the only legal question the United
States Supreme Court could resolve upon certiorari was the Boy
Scouts' First Amendment defense.' Thus, the scope of the
constitutional right of expressive association became the critical issue
in the case.
B. The Evolution of the Roberts Doctrine
When the Court set out to examine the Boy Scouts' expressive
association defense, it could have drawn readily from a significant
body of instructive case law. Specifically, the following trilogy of
Supreme Court precedent provides a workable framework for deciding
whether the enforcement of civil rights statutes, like the NJLAD,
would infringe upon a discriminator's right of expressive association:
48. Dale, 530 U.S. at 644 ("This case presents the question whether applying New
Jersey's public accommodations law in this way violates the Boy Scouts' First Amendment
right of expressive association').
49. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 277 (describing opinion of the trial court).
50. See id.
51. Seeid. at 293.
52. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev'd 530 US.
640(2000).
53. See id at 1211 ("[The] Boy Scouts is a 'public accommodation,' not simply
because of its solicitation activities, but also because it maintains close relationships with
federal and state governmental bodies and with other recognized public accommodations:').
54. Normally, the Supreme Court lacks the jurisdiction to disturb state court
interpretations of state law because Article Il of the United States Constitution limits its
review to "cases or controversies" arising under federal law. See U.S. CONST. art. I; see
generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 521-65 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing the relationship between state and
federal law). Supreme Court precedent, however, has recognized the authority of the Court to
conduct an independent review of state courts' factual findings in First Amendment cases.
See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("[l]n
cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an appellate court has an
obligation to 'make an independent examination of the whole record' in order to make sure
that 'the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression."').
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Roberts v United States Jaycees," Board of Directors of Rotary
International v Rotary Club,6 and New York State Club Ass'n v City
of New York.57
In Roberts, the United States Jaycees (Jaycees) filed a federal
lawsuit seeking an injunction to forbid application of the Minnesota
Human Rights Act, which banned gender discrimination in places of
public accommodation." The Jaycees excluded women from "full
membership""9 Two local chapters of the organization refused to
comply with the discriminatory policy and instituted an action before
the Minnesota Human Rights Commission to challenge the Jaycees'
exclusion of women as fifll members.' In the federal action, the
Jaycees sought to stop the proceedings that were before the Minnesota
Human Rights Commission."
The Jaycees defended its discrimination, as did the Boy Scouts,
by invoking the right of expressive association.' Specifically, the
organization alleged that the admission of women to the Jaycees on
terms equal to men would infringe upon its speech and associational
interests.63 The United States District Court for the District of
Minnesota ruled against the Jaycees, but the United States Court of
55. 468 US. 609 (1984).
56. 481 US. 537 (1987).
57. 487 US. 1 (1988).
58. 468 US. at 615-618.
59. The Roberts opinion details the Jaycees' discriminatory membership practices:
The organization's bylaws establish seven classes of membership, including
individual or regular members, associate individual members, and local chapters.
Regular membership is limited to young men between the ages of 18 and 35, while
associate membership is available to individuals or groups ineligible for regular
membership, principally women and older men. An associate member, whose dues
are somewhat lower than those charged regular members, may not vote, hold local
or national office, or participate in certain leadership training and awards
programs.
Id. at 613.
60. Id at 614. The national organization had threatened to revoke the charters of the
local chapters unless they ceased admitting women as fill members. Id.
61. Id. at 615. The trial court, however, dismissed the Jaycees' complaint without
prejudice; the court held that the Jaycees' could renew its action in the event that the
Minnesota Department of Human Rights issued a decision adverse to the Jaycees. See id. at
616. Subsequently, the Minnesota Department of Human Rights issued a decision finding
that the Jaycees violated the state's civil rights law and ordering the Jaycees to end its policy
of sex-based discrimination. Id. at 615-16. The Jaycees then renewed its federal action. Id.
at 616.
62. Id. at 615-17.
63. Id. at 615 ("The complaint alleged that, by requiring the organization to accept
women as regular members, application of the Act would violate the male members'
constitutional rights of free speech and association').
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Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that application of the
civil rights statute would in fact impair the Jaycees' expressive goals. 6'
The Eighth Circuit held that a "substantial part" of the Jaycees'
activities included the "expression of social and political beliefs and
the advocacy of legislation and constitutional change" and that the
organization had a First Amendment "right of association."'6 Although
the court acknowledged that many of the Jaycees' expressive activities
did not relate to gender, it nevertheless held that the inclusion of
women in the organization would likely change the group's
"philosophical cast.'" The court reasoned that "[it is not hard to
imagine" that the inclusion of women as "full-fledged members" in the
organization would result in attempts to change the Jaycees' creed.67
The group's creed contained the following declarations: "the
brotherhood of man transcends the sovereignty of nations ... [and]
economic justice can best be won by free men through free
enterprise." 8 The appellate court held that the goal of eradicating sex
discrimination in places of public accommodation was indeed a
"compelling interest" but that less-restrictive means were available for
the state to pursue this interest. 9
Thus, to support its conclusion that the admission of women as
full members in the Jaycees would impair the group's expression, the
court of appeals relied on four observations: (1) that the Jaycees
engaged in some expressive activities; (2) that it is easy to "imagine"
that women would attempt to dismantle the sex-specific components
of the group's creed; (3) that the Jaycees had established a policy
excluding women as full members; and (4) that the gender-based
exclusion was essential to maintain the group's autonomy." Although
the assumption that women and men might have distinct views on
certain issues is amply supportable,7 the court did not closely examine
64. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 E2d 1560, 1561 (8th Cir. 1983), revd sub
nom. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
65. Id at 1561.
66. See id. at 1571.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1562 (emphasis added).
69. Id. at 1576 ("The interest of the state, though compelling in the general sense,
will be less seriously impaired than at first appears if this challenged interference is
prevented, for reasons we have already explained. And the state has other ways, perhaps less
effective, but still powerful, to vindicate its interest.").
70. Id. at 1569-72.
71. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 149 (1994) (O'Connor J.,
concurring) ("[T]o say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to say that
gender makes no difference as a matter of fact").
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whether women-or men-had in fact sought to, or were seeking to,
alter the Jaycees' creed or whether there was even a demonstrable
nexus between the organization's numerous expressive activities and its
discriminatory practices.72 As a result, the appellate court failed to
consider sufficiently whether the group's discrimination was simply a
policy of invidious discrimination or whether, though invidious, it
related to some protectible speech interest.
1. Roberts and the Importance of Speech
The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals
decision in an opinion that articulated what would become the
governing framework for analyzing apparent conflicts between "free
speech" and "equality."73 The Court first identified and described the
expressive interest implicated by the dispute.'4 The Roberts decision
defined the right of "expressive association" as "a right [of individuals]
to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by
the First Amendment-speech, assembly, petition for the redress of
grievances, and the exercise of religion' ' 5 The Court's well-established
jurisprudence treats expressive association as both a derivative right
implied by the enumerated freedoms in the First Amendment and as a
collective right held by individuals who associate in order to engage in
First Amendment activities." The Roberts Court, respecting the
72. See McClure, 709 E2d at 1570-72. The fact that at least two chapters of the
Jaycees disagreed with the discriminatory policy suggests that many men wanted the
organization to become gender inclusive.
73. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 609.
74. kL at 617-18.
75. Id. at 618. The Court also defined another strand of associational liberty-the
right of "intimate association" Id. at 617-18. The Court describes "intimate association" as
the right "to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships." Id. The types of
relationships that have received protection under this liberty interest include "marriage, the
raising and education of children, and cohabitation with one's relatives." Hutchinson, supra
note 23, at 94 (citations omitted). Given the large size and unselective nature of the Jaycees,
the Court readily disposed of any argument that the right of intimate association shielded the
organization's discrimination based on gender. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 621.
76. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 ("An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to
petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from
interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those
ends were not also guaranteed" (citing Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair
Housing v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981)); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-84 (1965) (describing freedom of association as a right implied by the First
Amendment); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 US. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond
debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech."); see also Hutchinson, supra note 23, at
94-95; Douglas 0. Linder, Freedom ofAssociation After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82
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historical value of individual liberty, described expressive association
as an "indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties.""
2. Roberts and the Importance of Equality
The Roberts Court, however, also recognized the compelling goal
of equality, accomplished through the enforcement of constitutional
and statutory civil rights, and held that the right of expressive
association is not absolute." Rather than treating expressive liberty as
an unqualified constitutional interest, the Court held that governmental
restrictions on the right of expressive association are permissible if
they pursue "compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less
restrictive of associational freedoms" 9 The Roberts decision further
held that state public accommodations laws generally serve compelling
governmental interests."S Thus, the Roberts Court considered not only
the value of expressive association and liberty, but also recognized the
constitutional and social imperative of equality."
Cases such as Roberts and Dale place speech and equality in
conflict, reflecting a tension between the legal achievement of an
"egalitarian, rights-oriented liberalism" and a concomitant social
distrust for state intrusion into comiunity and individual autonomy"
The relationship between speech and equality, however, often has a far
more complicated and shifting existence. In subjugated communities,
for example, individuals might actually welcome governmental power
as a method for ensuring individual liberty, community autonomy, and
equal access to societal resources. 3 Furthermore, many of the
MICH. L. REv 1878, 1887 (1984) ('Although the word 'association' appears nowhere in the
first amendment ... a right to associate has long been recognized as necessary to safeguard
those activities specifically protected by the first amendment... " (footnote omitted)).
77. Roberts, 468 US. at 618 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 623.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 624 (holding that the state civil rights law "serves compelling state interests
of the highest order").
81. See William P. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right ofAssociation, 81 NW U.
L. REv 68, 92 (1986) ("The validity of the state interest in promoting equal access is not
controversial. The government's interest in eliminating discriminatory exclusions is
compelling when the discrimination adversely affects minority access to publicly available
opportunities?').
82. Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 95-96; Linder, supra note 76, at 1881-82.
83. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 96. See also PAuCiA J. WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 153 (1991) ("For the historically disempowered, the
conferring of rights is symbolic of all the denied aspects of their humanity: rights imply a
respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates one's status
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precedential settings for the evolution and development of the
contemporary right of expressive association involves cases brought by
blacks and civil rights organizations in the South.' In these cases,
plaintiffs invoked expressive liberties to contest racial subjugation and
inequality and to challenge racist governmental efforts to impair their
political organizing."S Thus, scholars and jurists should resist
automatically treating liberty and equality as oppositional goals; their
relationship is far more intricate and complicated than this reductionist
approach recognizes. 6
Together, the complex relationship between liberty and equality
and the historically important function of both of these fundamental
legal interests mean that courts must engage in thoughtful analyses of
both equality and expressive freedom and not treat either goal in
absolute terms or as trivial.87 The Roberts doctrine provides such a
framework because it respects both speech and equality and seeks to
make certain that only actual speech activities prevail over civil rights
enforcement when the two collide. 8
3. Roberts as an Evidentiary Standard Securing Equality and
Speech
Thus far, this Article has focused on the constitutional interests
and obligations implicated by the Roberts doctrine. In Roberts,
however, both constitutional and evidentiary concerns shaped the
Court's analysis. The Court closely analyzed the Jaycees' asserted
speech interests and based its conclusions regarding the content of the
from human body to social being."); Kirnberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARv. L.
REV 1331, 1357 (1988) ("[L]iberal legal ideology ... perform[s] an important function in
combating the experience of being excluded and oppressed*").
84. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29, 437 (1963) (invalidating a
statute that interfered with the speech and associational interests of a civil rights
organization); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,466 (1958) (same).
85. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
86. Professor William Marshall argues:
[Professor] Linder is inaccurate only in perceiving rights-oriented liberalism to be
solely on one side of the equation. Protecting individual choice also protects the
choice to discriminate. This, however, only makes the dilemma more complex.
Not only are competing values present, but the same values compete on both sides
of the issue.
See Marshall, supra note 8 1, at 69-70 (responding to Linder, supra note 76).
87. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 96 (arguing that courts should apply a
"multilayered approach to expressive freedoms").
88. Id. (describing the Roberts test as a "useful model" for resolving conflicts
between speech and equality).
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organization's speech and concerning those actions that would impair
its speech upon a careful examination of the evidence contained in the
record. 9 After its careful scrutiny of the evidence, the Court concluded
that application of the Minnesota civil rights statute to the Jaycees
would not suppress the group's expressive interests." The Court
examined the actual expressive activities of the organization in order to
determine whether its discriminatory policy furthered an actual
expressive purpose or whether its sex-based exclusion was merely
invidious discrimination, unrelated to the advancement of any ideas.9
The Supreme Court, unlike the court of appeals, did not take the
Jaycees' assertions at face value, nor did it simply "imagine" that the
organization's speech might be altered by the mere inclusion of
women.92 Instead, the Roberts Court closely canvassed the factual
record before concluding that no evidence could support the
defendant's proposition that the forced inclusion of women into the
organization would disturb the group's ability to pursue its political
advocacy.93 The Court observed that the Jaycees had expressed "public
positions" on a number of issues and that its members "regularly
engage" in expressive activities that are "worthy of constitutional
protection under the First Amendment?' 94 The Court, however,
concluded that the record contained no proof that the inclusion of
women as full members of the organization would impede its
expressive activities and the dissemination of its "preferred views?'"
The Court also held that the admission of women would not force the
organization to admit any individuals whose political and ideological
commitments diverged from those of the group." In addition, the
Court criticized the court of appeals for basing its ruling on the mere
"supposition" that women would interfere with the group's actual
speech activities."
Under the doctrine that emerged in Roberts, the Court required
much more than an argument constructed around the imagined impact
89. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-29 (1984) (examining
the factual predicate for the Jaycees' expressive association defense).
90. Id. at 628-29 (holding that application of the civil rights law would not impede
the Jaycees' expression, but holding, in the alternative, that any abridgement of the Jaycees'
speech or association satisfies a compelling governmental interest).
91. Id. at 626-29 (examining Jaycees' specific expressive activities).
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 626-27.
95. Id. at 627.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 627-28.
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of civil rights enforcement; the Court demanded clear evidence that the
antidiscrimination law would interfere with a group's expression."
While Roberts likely undervalued the potential ideological differences
between men and women,99 the ultimate decision was justifiable due to
the lack of a nexus between the defendant's discrimination and its
expression and the fact that the organization already admitted women
(but as nonvoting members).' 0 Because the Jaycees already included
women, albeit on an unequal footing, its claim that the inclusion of
women as full members would undermine its speech lost credibility.''
The Court applied the Roberts doctrine in two subsequent cases,
making this test the governing framework in litigation challenging civil
rights enforcement through expressive association defenses.'2 In each
of these cases, the Court carefully examined the facts in the record to
ascertain whether they supported the associations' characterizations of
their expressive activities and their claims that application of the
challenged civil rights statutes would frustrate these asserted speech
interests.3 The Roberts doctrine resolves these conflicts over speech
98. Id. at 628 (rejecting the Jaycees' expressive association defense because the
organization "relies solely on unsupported generalizations about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women").
99. Id. (rejecting the Jaycees' contention that women and men have different
philosophies as resting on "unsupported generalizations"). For a criticism of this analysis,
see Hunter, supra note 23, at 21 (arguing that "Roberts simply steam-rolled the defendant's
claims that admission of women would affect the expressive culture of a previously male-only
organization.... [Because the] defendants could not prove a male/female difference in
viewpoint defined in issue specific terms, ... Brennan dismissed the defendant's expressive
association defense as mere stereotyping").
100. Justice Brennan reasons that because
the Jaycees already invites women to share the group's views and philosophy and to
participate in much of its training and community activities.... any claim that
admission of women as full voting members will impair a symbolic message
conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenuated at
best.
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627.
101. Id; cf Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 730 (1982) (finding that
policy permitting men to audit classes at state university "fatally undermines" state's
argument that single-sex education protected women from the harmful presence of men in the
classroom).
102. See N.Y State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 US. 1, 10-15 (1988); Bd. of
Dirs. of Rotary Club Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537,544-49 (1987).
103. In Rotary Club, for example, the Court recognized that the organization
"engage[d] in a variety of commendable service activities that are protected by the First
Amendment" 481 U.S. at 548. This fact alone, however, did not prove the organization's
expressive association defense. Instead, the Court searched for evidence linking the
organization's discrimination to one of its specific expressive goals; the Court found such
evidence lacking. See id. at 548-49 (finding that the enforcement of the state civil rights law
would not force the group to abandon or alter any of its protected activities); see also N.Y
TULANE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 76:81
and equality by paying strict attention to both constitutional and
evidentiary concerns: the Roberts standard recognizes the vital right
of free expression, but it places the burden with parties asserting
expressive association defenses to prove, with clear evidence, how
their expression would suffer from the enforcement of civil rights
laws." Accordingly, the Roberts framework protects another
important interest in addition to liberty and equality: judicial integrity.
The Roberts evidentiary analysis ensures that courts will not unfairly
advance equality over liberty or liberty over equality, but that courts
would make decisions in these delicate cases only after an exhaustive
and honest analysis of the evidence underlying the factual claims
relevant to the expressive association defense. 5
State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13-14 (rejecting facial challenge to civil rights statutes because
clubs failed to demonstrate how the statute impairs any expressive activities).
104. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627-28.
105. One might criticize the Roberts evidentiary standard as placing too much
emphasis on equality and as requiring too much of discriminators. This contention, however,
is misplaced because the equality strand in Dale (and in the Roberts line of cases) is also fact-
intensive. James Dale, for example, conducted an extensive factual investigation of the types
of activities in which Boy Scouts engaged and sponsored. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am.,
734 A.2d 1196, 1211 (N.J. 1999), revd 530 U.S. 640 (2000); Respondents Brief, supra note
43, at *24-*29. This inquiry not only bolstered Dale's rebuttal of the Boy Scouts' expressive
association defense, but it also demonstrated that the Boy Scouts was a "place of public
accommodation" under New Jersey law and, thus, bound by the antidiscrimination statute.
See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208-18 (analyzing extensive facts that support finding that Boy
Scouts fits within the reach of the NJLAD). Similarly, in Roberts, a related decision by the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmatively answered the sole question of whether the Jaycees
was a place of public accommodation subject to the state civil rights statute. See United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W2d 764, 765-71 (Minn. 1981). The Court engaged in a
fact-driven analysis of the central equality claim in this dispute. See id. at 768-74.
Often, the expressive association defense might inevitably involve a more fact-intensive
analysis than the equality component in these cases. For example, Dale (and each case in the
Roberts trilogy) involved an explicit policy of discrimination on the basis of a prohibited
category. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 US. 640, 645, 651-53 (2000) (describing Boy
Scouts' exclusionary policy on "avowed homosexuality"); see also Roberts, 468 US. at 613-
14 (describing the Jaycees' policy by which women were not permitted to be full, voting
members); Rotary Club, 481 U.S. at 541 (describing the Rotary Club practice of excluding
women). The Boy Scouts' facially discriminatory actions diminished the factual inquiry
required of the plaintiff in this narrow respect. See Dale, 734 A.2d at 1218 ("Because we
hold that an assistant scoutmaster position is a 'privilege' and an 'advantage' of Boy Scout
membership, and because Boy Scouts has 'revoked' Dale's registration based on his 'avowed'
homosexuality, a prohibited form of discrimination under the statute, we conclude that Boy
Scouts has violated the [antidiscrimination law]?').
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C. The Closeting ofRoberts in Dale
1. Deference to Discriminators
While the Roberts doctrine establishes a careful evidentiary and
constitutional framework, the Dale decision abandons this test and
holds that courts adjudicating cases in the public accommodations
context must "give deference to an association's assertions regarding
the nature of its expression"' and to "an association's view of what
would impair its expression. ' Under this new deference "standard,"
the Boy Scouts' mere depiction of its expression in its legal brief
seemingly satisfies the evidentiary requirements for proving the
content of its speech. For example, the Court cites language in the Boy
Scouts' brief which states that the organization .'teach[es] that
homosexual conduct is not morally straight,' and that it does 'not want
to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."'"0 7
The Court intimates that this litigation position alone establishes the
substance of the Boy Scouts' speech; relying solely on these
statements, the Court concludes that it "need not inquire further to
determine the nature of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to
homosexuality 1"
The Court's new deference standard clearly requires far less from
discriminating defendants than the evidentiary test deployed in the
Roberts line of cases. Instead of mandating that courts conduct a
careful examination of the factual submissions concerning the
association's speech, the Court implies that the organization's
description of its speech in a legal brief can alone prove the content of
that expression, and it explicitly directs courts to give deference to
discriminating organizations. 9
The Court's deferential evidentiary approach unduly erodes the
sensitivity toward social equality that the Roberts doctrine endeavored
to protect. If a discriminator's description of its speech in a legal brief
alone establishes the content of its expression, then victims of
discrimination will not have the ability to disprove this element of the
expressive association defense. Every discriminator that advances a
defense of expressive association will argue that its exclusionary
policies pursue a particular expressive goal; such an allegation is, in
106. Dale, 530 US. at 653.
107. Id. at 651 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
108. Id.
109. See id. at 651-53.
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fact, an element of the defense."' The Court's deference standard, as
stated in Dale, requires absolutely no objective proof of the content of
the association's speech and, if followed literally, would allow
defendants to rest on their legal submissions."'
2. Deferential Evidentiary Review
Perhaps realizing that its deference analysis departs from prior
precedent in this context, or at least cognizant of the sweeping
implications of this test, the Court actually examines the factual
predicate for the Boy Scouts' claim, rather than resting its decision
solely on the Boy Scouts' brief."2 The Court's analysis, however,
simply reinforces and implements its newly announced deferential
standard because the evidence the Boy Scouts presents fails to
establish that the condemnation of homosexuality is in fact one of its
expressive goals."3 Under the Roberts doctrine, finding a clear
expressive interest in discrimination is an essential element of a
successful expressive association defense."4  Dale obscures this
important dimension of the Roberts test because it purports to discover
the substance of the Boy Scouts' expression after conducting an
extremely passive review of ambiguous, conflicting, and, perhaps,
contrived evidence."' The new deferential evidentiary test employed in
Dale permits the Court to overlook the deficiencies of the Boy Scouts'
evidence and to credit the organization's own questionable
representation of its expressive activities.
For instance, the Court concludes that the Boy Scouts' "LaW' and
"Oath," which require youth members to remain "morally straight" and
"clean,""' embody the association's heterosexism." ' The New Jersey
110. See Roberts, 468 US. at 627-28 (examining, in the context of an expressive
association defense, whether inclusion of a protected class in the organization would impair
the dissemination of the group's "preferred views").
111. See Dale, 530 US. at 651-53 (applying deferential analysis).
112. Id. at 648-55 (conducting evidentiary review of the Boy Scouts' expressive
association defense).
113. Id; see infra notes 116-143 and accompanying text.
114. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-29 (rejecting an association's claim that it engaged
in gender-based expression because none of its activities was gender specific).
115. See Dale, 530 US. at 648-54 (conducting an evidentiary review of the Boy
Scouts' expressive association defense).
116. The "Scout Oath" provides that "On my honor I will do my best; To do my duty
to God and my country and to obey the Scout Law; To help other people at all times; To keep
myself physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight?" Dale, 540 US. at 649
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). The "Scout Law" provides that "A Scout is:
Trustworthy, Obedient, Loyal, Cheerful, Helpful, Thrifty, Friendly, Brave, Courteous, Clean,
Kind, Reverent." Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
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Supreme Court,"' the New Jersey Appellate Division,1'9 and the
dissenting justices in Dale applied an evidentiary analysis more
consistent with Roberts and found that these ambiguous slogans do not
prove that members of the Boy Scouts assemble to express a
heterosexist viewpoint. Given the amorphous nature of this evidence,
the Court's conclusion that it expresses a heterosexist viewpoint is
"reasonable" only when understood as a product of its new deference
formula.
The Court also finds a 1978 memorandum from the Boy Scouts'
President and its Chief Scout Executive to the members of the
Executive Committee of the national organization probative of the
group's heterosexist expression.'2' In this memorandum, the two
officers of the organization state that they "do not believe that
homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate " ' As the
Dale dissenters observe, however, this statement does not itself pertain
to any of the organization's activities; instead, it simply constitutes an
invidious discriminatory statement.'" Roberts, however, requires that
an association demonstrate that its discrimination relates to a clear
expressive activity;24 because the 1978 memorandum fails to establish
this nexus, it is insufficient under the Roberts framework.
Additionally, the memorandum was never circulated beyond the
Executive Committee of the Boy Scouts; it remained, instead, a
"private statement" of the position of certain scouting executives.'
The Roberts Court, by contrast, considered whether members of the
organization came "together" to engage in a certain activity protected
117. Id. at 649-50 (accepting Boy Scouts' argument that the statements "morally
straight" and "clean" embody an antigay message).
118. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 (N.J. 1999), rev, 530 US. 640
(2000) ("The words 'morally straight' and 'clean' do not, on their face, express anything
about sexuality, much less that homosexuality, in particular, is immoral. We doubt that young
boys would ascribe any meaning to these terms other than a commitment to be good:').
119. See Dale, 706 A.2d at 289-90 (rejecting the Boy Scouts' contention that the
statements "morally straight" and "clean" embody an antigay bias).
120. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 668-69 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (after extensively reviewing
Boy Scouts' literature, concluding that "[i]t is plain as the light of day that neither one of these
principles-'morally straight' and 'clean'-says the slightest thing about homosexuality" and
that "neither term in the Boy Scouts' Law and Oath expresses any position whatsoever on
sexual matters").
121. Id. at 651-52.
122. Id. at 652.
123. Id. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[T]he 1978 statement simply says that
homosexuality is not 'appropriate.' It makes no effort to connect that statement to a shared
goal or expressive activity of the Boy Scouts?').
124. See supra Part II.B.3.
125. Dale, 530 US. at 673 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2001]
TULANE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 76:81
by the First Amendment.'26 Such an approach is consistent with the
traditional definition of the right of expressive association as a
"collective" right to engage in First Amendment activities.2 7  Rather
than protecting any view held by members of the organization, the
right of expressive association protects the views for which members
of the organization associate to express. ' Given the private nature of
the memorandum, the Court's ruling that it embodies the collective
viewpoint of the Boy Scouts' members is highly problematic.'29 The
Court, however, does not even attempt to explain how the
memorandum reflects the collective views of the Boy Scouts. The
Court's failure to address the weaknesses of this evidence likely results
from its application of the deference standard that it constructs in
Dale.'30 Because the Court holds that it must defer to a discriminator's
description of its speech interests, evidentiary ambiguities and
insufficiencies do not necessarily defeat an expressive association
defense. The Roberts framework, by contrast, required clearer and
more consistent evidence from the discriminating organizations.'3'
126. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (holding that the
Court recognizes a freedom of expressive association because forcing an organization to
admit an unwanted individual "may impair the ability of the original members to express only
those views that brought them together") (emphasis added); id. at 622 ("An individual's
freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances
could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom
to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed") (emphasis added).
127. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text
128. See Churchill v. Waters, 977 E2d 1114, 1120 n.6 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 513 U.S. 804 (1994) (holding that "the right to expressive association 'is not
implicated when two persons simply hold common beliefs or even when those different
person[s] express those common beliefs-they must join together "for the purpose of"
expressing those shared views' (alteration in original)); see also Dale, 530 US. at 682-85
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
129. Ironically, the memorandum states that a member of the Boy Scouts "who openly
declares himself to be a homosexual" should only be terminated "in the absence of any law to
the contrary" Dale, 530 U.S. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). The
memorandum indicates that the president was not aware of any such laws, but stated that if
such laws were eventually passed, the Boy Scouts would have to abide by them. Id. at 671-73
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, if the memorandum actually represents the "collective" views
of the Boy Scouts, then it suggests a preference for civil rights compliance.
130. Id. at 651-54 (developing deferential evidentiary analysis); see supra notes 106-
111 and accompanying text.
131. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-22, 626-28. Nancy Knauer offers a very important
antiheterosexist argument that supports the Court's finding that the Boy Scouts' collective
expression includes the condemnation of homosexuality. See Nancy J. Knauer, "Simply So
Different'" The Uniquely Expressive Character of the Openly Gay Individual After Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 89 Ky. L.J. 997, 1020-31 (2001). Knauer argues that the absence
of any "clear" evidence proving the Boy Scouts' heterosexism should not defeat the
organization's defense because in a heterosexist society, the "default position" is
heteronormative (i.e., antigay). Id. While Knauer correctly observes the ubiquitous nature of
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The remaining evidence that the Court cites as evincing the Boy
Scouts' heterosexism all emerged in the context of litigation
surrounding the organization's antigay discrimination.'32 Specifically,
the Court finds the following pieces of evidence probative of the Boy
Scouts' antigay views: a 1991 document that the Boy Scouts drafted
after it revoked Dale's membership in scouting ' and during the
pendency of a similar lawsuit in California state courts, which
challenged the group's antigay discrimination," 4 as well as a 1993
document that the Boy Scouts wrote after Dale filed his lawsuit that
challenged the organization's policy of discrimination.'35 The 1991
memorandum states, "We believe that homosexual conduct is
inconsistent with the requirement in the Scout Oath that a Scout be
morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in word
and deed, and that homosexuals do not provide a desirable role model
for Scouts:"'36 The 1993 statement makes a similar declaration,
proclaiming that "[t]he Boy Scouts ... has always reflected the
expectations that Scouting families have had for the organization. We
do not believe that homosexuals provide a role model consistent with
these expectations. Accordingly, we do not allow for the registration of
avowed homosexuals as members or as leaders of the [Boy Scouts]"' 37
For at least two important reasons, the Court's conclusion that these
heterosexism, a First Amendment doctrine that requires less than clear evidence would
constitutionalize invidious discrimination and pretextual speech claims in a host of settings.
American society certainly contains oppressive class, racial, sexual, and gender hierarchies.
Yet, a doctrine that allows places of public accommodation to prove the content of their
expression by pointing to social strata alone (and not offering other clear evidence) would
have sweeping implications for antidiscrimination law. Such an approach could virtually
immunize discriminating organizations from civil rights enforcement.
132. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-56 (reviewing the Boy Scout's post-litigation
statements concerning homosexuality).
133. See Dale, 530 US. at 652; see also id. at 673-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that the memoranda relied upon by the Court were drafted after Dale was expelled from the
Boy Scouts).
134. See Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 195 Cal. Rptr.
325, 328 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983), aff', 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) (finding that the civil rights
complaint by a gay male against the Boy Scouts stated a cause of action under the state civil
rights statute). The first reported decision in this matter is the 1983 appellate court decision
cited above, and the final adjudication in this case took place in 1998. See Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 952 P.2d 218, 220-22 (Cal. 1998) (declining to
apply the civil rights statute to the Boy Scouts). Thus, the 1991 memorandum the Boy Scouts
relies upon in Dale was drafted in the context of an ongoing litigation challenging its sexual
orientation discrimination.
135. Dale filed his lawsuit against the Boy Scouts in 1992. See Dale, 530 US. at 645,
652.
136. Id. at652.
137. Id.
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documents embody a collective will to engage in heterosexist
expression results from its application of an exceedingly deferential
evidentiary review.'38
First, these documents do not link the heterosexism the Boy
Scouts supposedly advocates to any of the organization's activities.
The 1993 document refers to the undocumented "expectations" of
families with children in the Boy Scouts, while the 1991 document
refers to the ambiguous Boy Scouts slogans that do not state a clear
heterosexist position.'39 The unsubstantiated desires of parents of the
Boy Scouts' members and a reference to ambiguous slogans of the
organization cannot establish a clear linkage between the institution's
policy of discrimination and an expressive viewpoint."'" Most
importantly, however, the post-litigation nature of these documents
detract from their credibility. Each of these statements contends that
the Boy Scouts believes that homosexuality conflicts with the
viewpoints of the association, which is precisely the issue that Dale's
civil rights lawsuit raises.'4' While post-litigation statements are not
inadmissible or entirely nonprobative, courts do consider whether such
statements are simply self-serving or whether they are indisputable
statements of truth.142 The Court's failure to address the credibility of
these documents is understandable only as a product of its extremely
deferential evidentiary analysis.'
43
138. Id. at 651-54 (developing deferential evidentiary standard).
139. See id. at 671-78 (Stevens J., dissenting) (rejecting the Boy Scouts' arguments
that its post-litigation memoranda prove its expressive association defense).
140. See id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Seeid.at645.
142. See, e.g., FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 E2d 289,298 (4th Cir. 1977) ("Basically,
resort to subjective evidence raises problems of credibility made acute by the self-serving
nature of statements made after litigation has ensued'); United Telecomm., Inc. v. Am.
Television & Comm. Corp., 536 E2d 1310, 1318 (10th Cir. 1976) ("[L]etters written after a
breach [of contract] and after a party has become aware that litigation is imminent are seldom
received. They are characterized as self-serving and inadmissible:'); Farris v. Sturner, 264
E2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1959) (rejecting letter proffered as evidence on the grounds that "[a]
man cannot make evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements he wishes
to prove"); Hoffman v. Palmer, 129 E2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), aff'd 318 US. 109 (1943)
(rejecting memorandum prepared while litigation imminent because the document was
"dripping with motivations to misrepresent"); Puliafico v. County of San Bernardino, 42 E
Supp. 2d. 1000, 1004 n.5 (C.D. Cal. 1999) ("Plaintiff's general objection that self-serving
litigation-generated declarations should be stricken goes to weight and credibility... "').
143. Surprisingly, the dissenting justices do not address the credibility of these
documents. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, summarily dismissed these documents
as "self-serving' See Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1224 n.12 (N.J. 1999),
rev, 530 US. 640 (2000) (finding that the "self-serving nature" of the post-litigation
position statements upon which the Boy Scouts relies "is apparent").
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From an equality standpoint, the most sweeping and potentially
dangerous aspect of the deferential evidentiary review arises when the
Court seemingly rejects the requirement that a discriminating
defendant needs to prove that its policy of discrimination furthers a
defined collective speech interest.'" The Court holds that a defendant
"do[es] not have to associate for the 'purpose' of disseminating a
certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the First
Amendment. [Instead, an] association must merely engage in
expressive activity that could be impaired in order to be entitled to
protection 1 45  This standard severely undervalues the compelling
governmental interest in equality. Although it is unclear to what extent
and in what manner courts will apply this language, strict adherence to
this seamless standard would allow any organization that engages in
"some" expression to prove an expressive association defense without
demonstrating how civil rights enforcement would impede a clear
expressive and collective interest.
The deferential evidentiary standard announced in Dale is
additionally troubling because there is no precedential support for
according deference to private civil rights defendants, especially to
admitted discriminators who exclude statutorily protected classes. On
the contrary, the preexisting precedent rigorously analyzed expressive
association defenses raised in opposition to the enforcement of
antidiscrimination laws.'46 In addition, while the Court has given
Congress deference to discriminate in the context of national
security,'47 this doctrine is not without controversy, as many
144. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 655.
145. Id (emphasis added).
146. See supra Part II.B.3; see also Dale, 530 U.S. at 686 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I
am unaware of any previous instance in which our analysis of the scope of a constitutional
right was determined by looking at what a litigant asserts in his or her brief and inquiring no
further.'). The only precedent the Court "finds" to support its deference analysis is
Democratic Party of United States v Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 US. 107 (1981). See
Dale, 530 US. at 651. This case, however, is readily distinguishable from Dale because it
involves a challenge to a state statute that interfered with association and speech in the
context of political parties. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 109, 121-24. Unlike the Boy Scouts-a
place of public accommodation-political parties have pronounced, rather than ambiguous,
speech interests. Furthermore, political speech is accorded the highest level of constitutional
protection. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (holding that in the context of core
political speech, First Amendment protection is "at its zenith"). Accordingly, La Follette
cannot reasonably serve as a justification for the deferential standard applied in Dale.
147. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 US. 503, 507 (1986) ("In the context of the
present case, when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on
religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment
of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest:');
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 66 (1981) ("The operation of a healthy deference to
20011
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commentators consider it a mask for legitimating discrimination and
deprivations of liberty or as an abdication of judicial review.'
Furthermore, no one could reasonably argue that the interests the
Court identifies to justify extending deference to Congress, such as
separation of powers and judicial incompetence in military affairs,"
actually exist in the context of private civil rights litigation. Thus, the
Dale evidentiary standard is inconsistent with established maxims in
antidiscrimination law, both in the narrow setting of public
accommodations litigation and in the general context of civil rights
jurisprudence. Consequently, Dale greatly undermines the
enforcement of antidiscrimination laws.
III. DALEAND THE REINFORCEMENT OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL,
AND TRANSGENDER INVISIBILITY
A. Outness-Not Mere Gay Status-Frustrates the Boy Scouts'
Expressive Goals
After concluding that the Boy Scouts' expressive goals include a
desire not to "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
legislative and executive judgments in the area of military affairs is evident in several recent
decisions of this Court."); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974) ("For the reasons which
differentiate military society from civilian society, we think Congress is permitted to legislate
both with greater breadth and with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which the
former shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for the latter').
148. See Kirstin S. Dodge, Countenancing Corruption: A Civic Republican Case
Against Judicial Deference to the Military, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 17-38, 44 (1992)
(arguing that "judicial deference to the military ignores the wisdom and cautions of the
nation's founders and the civic-republican ideals that influenced them, and undermines the
nation's ability to maintain and strengthen democratic self-government in our modem,
heterogeneous social and political culture"); Kenneth L. Karst, The Purit of Manhood and
the Desegregation of the Armed Forces, 38 UCLA L. REV 499, 572 (1991) (critiquing the
conferring of deference to the military and arguing that "[a) doctrine that immunizes harmfil
governmental discrimination from serious judicial inquiry deserves more justification than a
figure of speech" and that the deference doctrine involves a mechanical "recital that judges
are incompetent to second-guess the expert judgment of military authorities or the better-
informed judgment of Congress in military matters"); see also Goldman, 475 U.S. at 515
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Today the Court eschews its constitutionally mandated role. It
adopts for review of military decisions affecting First Amendment rights a subrational-basis
standard-absolute, uncritical 'deference to the professional judgment of military
authorities'); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 112 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court substitutes
hollow shibboleths about 'deference to legislative decisions' for constitutional analysis. It is
as if the majority has lost sight of the fact that 'it is the responsibility of this Court to act as
the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."'(citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549
(1969))).
149. See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507-08 (linking judicial deference to military
judgment to separation of powers principles and to judicial incompetence in matters of
national security); Rostker, 453 U.S. at 64-69 (same).
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behavior," the Court considers whether Dale's presence in the group
would unconstitutionally impair this goal."'5 The Court deploys a
deferential evidentiary analysis in this context as well, holding that it
must give "deference to an association's view of what would impair its
expression. " ''
Adhering to its deference standard, the Court finds that the forced
inclusion of James Dale within the Boy Scouts would compel the
organization to "send a message, both to the youth members and the
world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior" ' 2 The Court's reasoning on this issue reinforces the
invisibility of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identity.
Although the Court finds that it must defer to a discriminator's view of
what would impede its speech, the Court cautions that its ruling does
not mean "that an expressive association can erect a shield against
antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a
member from a particular group would impair its message.""3 Hence,
the Court purports to reject a simple status-based form of
discrimination. The Boy Scouts could not exclude Dale merely
because he is gay and evade application of the NJLAD. The Court,
nevertheless, concludes that Dale's actions and speech relating to his
sexuality demonstrate that his inclusion in the Boy Scouts would
unconstitutionally frustrate the organization's speech goals."M Thus, the
Court legitimizes the Boy Scouts' discrimination against Dale on
account of his "outness," which the Court treats as distinct from his
mere "membership" in a "particular group" (gay males) or from his
gay-male "status" alone. " The Court's reasoning constructs a false
and destructive dichotomy between speech and sexual identity.
Under the Court's analysis, the Boy Scouts can only prove its
defense by excluding gays as speakers-but not as gays qua gays.'56
The Court then points to the following speech-related facts as
establishing that the Boy Scouts only intends to exclude Dale's
destructive message. First, Dale is openly gay.'51 The Court observes
that "Dale, by his own admission, is one of a group of gay Scouts who
150. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 (quotations omitted) (considering whether Dale's presence
in Boy Scouts would "significantly burden" the organization's expression).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 653-65 (discussing Dale's expression).
155. Seeid.at644-56.
156. See id
157. Id. at 653.
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have 'become leaders in their community and are open and honest
about their sexual orientation.."'. The Court also discusses Dale's
involvement in gay and lesbian politics and social support groups. 5'
The Court notes that "Dale was the copresident of a gay and lesbian
organization at college and remains a gay rights activist' l ' The Court,
following the Boy Scouts' lead, also repeatedly describes Dale as an
"avowed homosexual" 6' a person who would undoubtedly complicate
the Boy Scouts' allegedly heterosexist speech interests. 2 By pointing
to Dale's speech and activities, the Court attempts to rest its decision
that the Boy Scouts can lawfully exclude Dale from the organization
upon his actions and words, not on his status alone.
B. The Reality ofExpressive Identity
1. Outness and Identity
The Dale Court's disaggregation of outness and gay status marks
a further retreat from the commitment to equality secured by the
Roberts line of cases because this reasoning conditions civil rights
protection on the silencing of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
people. The Court plainly holds that Dale's mere gay "status" would
not legitimate his exclusion." The Court, nevertheless, locates certain
activities and speech attributable to Dale that supposedly render the
Boy Scouts' discrimination a separate species than status-based
discrimination. Rather than finding that the Boy Scouts has
discriminated against Dale on the basis of his gay status, the Court
concludes that the organization has lawfully excluded him on account
of his outness and political commitment to gay and lesbian equality'"
Outness, however, is a critical component of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender identities. Numerous studies, for example, have
158. Id. (emphasis added).
159. Id at 645, 653.
160. Id at 653 (emphasis added).
161. See, e.g., id. at 644 ("Respondent is James Dale, a former Eagle Scout whose
adult membership in the Boy Scouts was revoked when the Boy Scouts learned that he is an
avowed homosexual and gay rights activist"); id at 655-56 ("The presence of an avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's uniform sends a distinctly
different message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record
as disagreeing with Boy Scouts policy."). See also Petitioners Brief, supra note 43, at *20
("Requiring a Boy Scout Troop to appoint an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist as an
Assistant Scoutmaster unconstitutionally abridges First Amendment rights of freedom of
speech and freedom of association") (capitalization omitted).
162. See Dale, 530 US. at 653-55.
163. Id. at 653.
164. Id. at 653-54.
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demonstrated the importance of "coming out" in fostering the
psychological health of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
individuals.'65 The process of public self-identification, however, is not
a uniformly positive experience for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender individuals due to racial, class, gender, nationality, and
other social divisions within oppressed communities.' Nevertheless,
outness remains a critical component of queer identity formation.
"Coming out" also allows gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
individuals to organize socially and politically and to confront
heterosexist hierarchies. Furthermore, because identity categories
and systems of oppression are interrelated and synergistic
165. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., A Jurisprudence of "Coming Out" Religion,
Homosexualift and Collisions of Liberty and Equality in American Public Law, 106 YALE
L.J. 2411, 2442 (1997) ("The closet diminishes not only the integrity of its denizens, but also
their mental health.... A wide variety of psychologists have found that.., the best-adjusted
gay individuals have gone through a process of 'acceptance and appreciation' of their sexual
identity"); Marc A. Fajer, Can Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-
Role Stereotypes, and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv 511,
596-97 (1992) (discussing the mental health costs of gay people concealing their sexual
identity); Gregory M. Herek, Myths About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social
Science Research, 1 LAW & SEXUALrrY 133, 145-46 (1991) (arguing that "lesbians and gay
men probably maintain self esteem most effectively when they identify with and are
integrated into the larger lesbian and gay community").
166. See Combahee River Collective, A Black Feminist Statement, in THis BRIDGE
CALLED MY BACK: WRTINGS BY RADICAL wOMEN OF COLOR 210, 214 (Cherrie Moraga &
Gloria Anzald'ia eds., 2d ed. 1983) (questioning "whether lesbian separatism is an adequate
and progressive political analysis and strategy ... since it so completely denies any but the
sexual sources of women's oppression, negating the facts of class and race"); Patricia A. Cain,
Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-90)
(arguing that homophobia in feminist communities divides women); Darren Lenard
Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and
Political Discourse, 29 CONN. L. REV 561, 603 (1997) ("The coming out process ... does not
necessarily or automatically 'liberate' people of color, who, by revealing their sexual
orientation and attempting to integrate themselves within white gay and lesbian communities,
may encounter racial hierarchy:'); see also A LoTus OF ANOTHER COLOR: AN UNFOLDING OF
THE SouTH AsIAN GAY AND LESBIAN EXPERIENCE 12-17 (Rakesh Ratti ed., 1993) ("Once
some of us entered the lesbian and gay subculture of the West, our feeling of isolation did not
fade .... None of our newly found gay or lesbian friends and acquaintances spoke our
languages, shared our history, or really understood our culture"); SHANE PHELAN, IDENTrrY
POLmCs: LESBIAN FEMMISM AND THE LIMrTS OF COMMUNrrY 161-66 (1989) (discussing
racial and class critiques of lesbian separatism).
167. See Eskridge, supra note 165, at 2443; Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet:
Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REv. 915
(1989) (justifying the application of heightened scrutiny to antigay discrimination on grounds
that homophobia and gay and lesbian invisibility render gays and lesbians politically
powerless); Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 121 ("The closet harms gay communities because it
hinders the ability of gays and lesbians to engage in collective political action to achieve
equality."); Knauer, supra note 131, at 1035 ("From the standpoint of the individual
homosexual, coming out is a necessary prerequisite to claiming identity as a homosexual
citizen.").
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phenomena, '  gay and lesbian visibility permits a more honest
portrayal of identity within a host of marginalized communities and
fosters the development of more multidimensional antisubordination
theories and advocacy.9
The Court's separation of outness and gay status fails to recognize
the compelling linkages among outness, identity, and equality. Under
the Court's constricted analysis, sexual identity exists apart from any
expressive and associational activities. The Court's reasoning treats
sexual identity as a static and, presumably, quiet "trait' By failing to
recognize the expressive components of sexual identity, the Court
legitimizes homophobic discrimination on the basis of outness,
constricts the scope of legal protection for gays, lesbians, bisexuals,
and transgendered people, and reinforces and constructs gay and
lesbian invisibility. "
2. Expressive Identity and Contemporary Social Theory
The Court's separation of outness from queer status conflicts with
recent understandings of social identity. Contemporary social and
legal theorists have persuasively dispelled traditional notions that
identity categories such as race, gender, and sexual orientation are
creatures of biology; instead, these categories are socially constructed,
owing their existence to an intricate web of politics, history,
168. Many scholars have addressed the relationship among the various forms of
subordination and among the numerous social identity categories. See, e.g., Kimberle
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv 1241 (1991) (discussing the "intersectionality" of racism
and sexism); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites"?: Race, Sexual
Identity and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REv 1358, 1361-82 (2000)
[hereinafter Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Wi'tes'] (criticizing white normative content
of pro-gay and antigay discourse); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of
Race: Heteronormativity Chtical Race Theory and Anti-Racist Politics, 47 BuFF. L. REV I
(1999) [hereinafter Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race] (exploring the
significance of sexuality to racial domination); Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the
Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV 1183, 1189 (1991) ("As we look at
... patterns of oppression, we may come to learn, finally and most importantly, that all forms
of subordination are interlocking and mutually reinforcing"').
169. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 121 (arguing that coming out helps challenge
essentialism in oppressed communities). See generally Hutchinson, supra note 166;
Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins, Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in
the Law, Theory and Politics of "Sexual Orientation," 48 HASTINGs L.J. 1293, 1311-19
(1997).
170. On the law's role in constructing "the closet," see William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law
and the Construction of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946,
82 IOWA L. REV 1007, 1102-06 (1997) (concluding, after reviewing a number of regulatory
contexts, that the law has had a significant role in constructing the closet).
[Vol. 76:81
2001] BOY SCOUTS v. DALE
economics, and social relations.'7' These identity categories also have
expressive dimensions. Because identity often forms the basis for
social marginalization, statements and expressions of identity become
methods of contesting oppression and reconstructing identity in a more
positive light." For example, the Black Power Movement of the 1960s
attempted to redepict "blackness" as a source of pride, rather than
stigmatization. Blackness thus became a political quantity, one that
served as a source of identity construction, political organization, and
resistance."3 The expression "Black Is Beautifil" thus served as a tool
to build identity, rather than as a mere verbal acknowledgment of some
preexisting, innate, clinical status. 4  Expression, as scholars such as
Nan Hunter have demonstrated, constitutes and constructs identity."
171. See, e.g., Halley, supra note 23 (criticizing biological essentialism in sexuality
social theory and equal protection analysis); Jayne Chong-Soon Lee, Review Essay,
Nmigating the Topology of Race, 46 STAN. L. REV 747, 777 (1994) ("Race cannot be self-
evident on the basis of skin color, for skin color alone has no inherent meaning"); Haney
L6pez, supra note 23, at 27 ("Race must be viewed as a social construction. That is, human
interaction rather than natural differentiation must be seen as the source and continued basis
for racial categorization" (footnote omitted)); john a. powell, The 'Racing" of American
Society: Race Functioning as a Verb Before Signifying as a Noun, 15 LAw & INEQ. 99, 102
(1997) ("[R]ace is an experiential truth and it is a categorical error to attempt to reduce the
meanings and functions of race to scientifically verifiable measurements.").
172. Nan Hunter's work illuminates this critical dimension of social identity:
Identity cannot exist without representation. Speech and other expressive
activity associated with identity is also a form of dissent. Individuals can often
communicate certain kinds of identity, such as race, without conscious action.
Other kinds of identity, such as religion, are typically invisible. But even
individuals with visible identities can communicate consciously chosen messages
of group pride and dissent from negative assumptions or stereotypes. Claims of
equality based on identities of difference are intrinsically a kind of protest.
Hunter, supra note 23, at 5.
173. As Kimberl6 Crenshaw has argued,
[T]he process of categorizing-or, in identity terms, naming-is not unilateral.
Subordinated people can and do participate, sometimes even subverting the
naming process in empowering ways. One need only think about the historical
subversion of the category "Black" or the current transformation of "queer" to
understand that categorization is not a one-way street. Clearly, there is unequal
power, but there is nonetheless some degree of agency that people can and do exert
in the politics of naming. And it is important to note that identity continues to be a
site of resistance for members of different subordinated groups.
Crenshaw, supra note 168, at 1297.
174. Kimberfl Crenshaw makes a similar argument about the important role of
language and expression in "black" identity formation. She observes that:
We all can recognize the distinction between the claims "I am Black" and the claim
"I am a person who happens to be Black." "I am Black" takes the socially imposed
identity and empowers it as an anchor of subjectivity. "I am Black" becomes not
simply a statement of resistance but also a positive discourse of self-identification,
intimately linked to celebratory statements like the Black nationalist "Black is
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In Dale, however, the Court treats identity as a fixed, clinical
phenomenon. The Dale decision is not the first occasion for judicial
misconstruction of gay and lesbian identity. In Hurley v fish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group,'76 the Court unanimously
held that the First Amendment precluded enforcement of the
Massachusetts public accommodations law to force defendants to
include a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual marchers in the Boston
St. Patrick's Day Parade."' The Court concluded that the parade
organizers were not attempting to exclude "homosexuals as such" but
had simply decided not to include gays, lesbians, and bisexuals who
wished to march in the parade with a banner identifying themselves as
gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-Americans. ' The Court held that the
parade organizers merely excluded unwanted speech from the parade,
not persons with a disfavored status."9 Even assuming a separability of
speech and identity, the Hurley decision ignored the factual record that
beautiful?' "I am a person who happens to be Black," on the other hand, achieves
self-identification by straining for a certain universality (in effect, "I am first a
person") and for a concommitant dismissal of the imposed category ("Black") as
contingent, circumstantial, nondeterminant. There is truth in both
characterizations, of course, but they function quite differently depending on the
political context. At this point in history, a strong case can be made that the most
critical resistance strategy for disempowered groups is to occupy and defend a
politics of social location rather than to vacate and destroy it.
Id. (emphasis added). The processes that construct "queer" and "black" identities do not exist
in separate spheres. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Claiming" and "'Speaking" Who We
Are: Black Gays and Lesbians, Racial Politics, and the Million Man March, in BLACK MEN
ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALrrY: A CRmCAL READER 28 (Devon W Carbado ed., 1999)
(discussing the construction of black gay identity).
175. Nan Hunter argues that:
Expression is the crucible in which identity is formed. Identity cannot exist
subjectively without the constitutive impact of complex discursive systems, one of
which is expression. Discourses shape individual experiences of self-
identification, in part by a process of normalization that makes particular
differences matter. Ideas shape identity, and culture creates the self, at least as
much as the reverse. Identity is not a prediscursive, biological given.
Hunter, supra note 23, at 9.
176. 515 US. 557 (1995).
177. See id. at 559.
178. Id. at 572 (emphasis added). Specifically, the Court held that the parade
organizers
disclaim[ed] an intent to exclude homosexuals as such, and no individual member
of [the gay, lesbian, and bisexual Irish-American group (GLIB)] claims to have
been excluded from parading as a member of any group that the Council has
approved to march. Instead, the disagreement goes to the admission of GLIB as its
own parade unit carrying its own banner.
179. Id.
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strongly indicated that the parade organizers were in fact reacting to
the plaintiffs' sexual identity, rather than their speech."' More
importantly, in both Dale and Hurley, the Court fails to recognize that
self-proclamations of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender identity
are fundamental to the construction and survival of these identities."'
The Court, instead, understands sexual identity as a clinical status,
rather than a product of expression and human interaction.'
The Dale dissenters do not prove more knowledgeable than the
majority on this point. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Souter, explicitly embraces a distinction between gay
and lesbian "conduct" and "status."' 83 According to Justice Stevens,
the Boy Scouts' evidence only demonstrates, at most, that the
organization disapproves of homosexual "conduct" rather than
homosexual "status" and that the group expelled James Dale based on
his "sexual orientation" alone.'"' The dissenting justices also focus on
the narrow and remote nature of Dale's expression, rather than linking
his speech and identity.' Justice Stevens, for example, argues that the
record does not support a finding that Dale "ever advocated a view on
homosexuality to his troop before his membership was revoked' 8 6 or
that he "would advocate any views on homosexuality to his troop"'' 7 if
his membership were reinstated. While these facts might ultimately
bear on whether Dale's membership in the Boy Scouts would impair
the group's purported expression,' '  the dissenting opinion missed a
180. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 103 (arguing that the record in Hurley
contained ample evidence of the parade organizer's discriminatory intent).
181. Id. at 122 ("Public self-identification plays an important role in the formation of
complex social identities:').
182. See PHELAN, supra note 166, at 19-35 (criticizing the "medicalization" of
homosexuality by conservative and liberal thinkers); David B. Cruz, Controlling Desires:
Sexual Orientation Conversion and the Limits of Knowledge and Law, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
1297, 1303-21, 1350-61 (1999) (discussing the oppression of gays and lesbians through the
medical pathologizing of homosexuality).
183. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 676 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that Dale was excluded because of his sexual "orientation," not because of his sexual
"conduct").
184. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Boy Scouts' memoranda can
only possibly indicate that "'homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the requirement in the
Scout Oath that a Scout be morally straight and in the Scout Law that a Scout be clean in
word and deed," that "New Jersey's law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation" and that "when Dale was expelled from the Boy Scouts, [the organization] said it
did so because of his sexual orientation, not because of his sexual conduct").
185. See id. at 688-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 689 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. See in2fra notes 312-318 and accompanying text. During the completion of this
Article, the District of Columbia Commission on Human Rights ruled that the First
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vital opportunity to correct the Court's artificial separation of identity
and expression in both Dale and Hurley.'9
The work of Shane Phelan, a theorist in lesbian studies, contests
essentialist, clinical understandings of sexual identity."' Phelan urges
scholars to conceive of identity as a "process" 1' Phelan views public
declarations of a marginalized sexual identity not as the simple
acknowledgment of a fixed status, but as part of an intricate process of
identity construction." Under Phelan's persuasive framework,
[t]he closet changes. Leaving the closet is not a matter of simple
visibility, but is a reconfiguration of the self. It is a project rather than
an event. Becoming lesbian is indeed a process of resistance to
patriarchal heterosexuality. It is not the discovery or revelation of one's
resistance but is the resistance itself. Furthermore, this project is never
complete. One is never "fmally' "truly" a lesbian, but becomes lesbian
or not with the choices one makes.'
93
Phelan's conceptualization of identity as an expressive and
deliberative process, rather than as a biological imposition, provides a
richer lens for understanding the facts underlying the dispute in Dale,
particularly those facts that relate to James Dale's expression of his
sexuality. Dale admits that he
lived a double life while in high school, pretending to be straight while
attending a military academy.
He remembers dating girls and even laughing at homophobic jokes
while at school, only admitting his homosexuality during his second
year at Rutgers.
I was looking for a role model, someone who was gay and accepting
of me ... a community that would take [me] in and provide [me] ...
with a support network and friends.'94
Amendment does not shield the Boy Scouts' discriminatory discharge of two gay male
leaders. See Pool v. Boy Scouts of Am., Nos. 93-030, 93-031 (D.C. Comm'n on Human
Rights June 18, 2001), available at http://vvww.rdblaw.com/boyscouts.pdf. The Commission
distinguished the Dale decision on the grounds that the two complainants did not advocate
any viewpoints concerning homosexuality within the Boy Scouts. See id. at 61-62.
189. Because Hurley was unanimously decided, the Dale dissent's failure to address
the relationship between speech and expression is not entirely surprising.
190. See SHANE PHELAN, GETiNG SPECIFIC: POSTmODERN LESBIAN POLmIcs 41-56
(1994).
191. Id.at52.
192. Id. at 51 (criticizing the traditional view that sees coming out simply as an act of
"revelation, an acknowledgment of a previously hidden truth").
193. Id. at 52.
194. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 689-90 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quotations omitted).
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Dale's "narrative" illustrates Phelan's processual theory of
identity: Dale's openness and expression, including antiheterosexist
political participation, allowed him to shed the oppression of the closet
and invisibility and to find a community of peers to provide a stable
environment in which to "become" gay. Hence, Dale's outness and
political activities were not mere disclosures of a hidden status.
Instead, these activities allowed him to "fashion[] a self... that did not
exist before coming out began" '  Dale's expression and association
thus constituted the mechanics of identity formation; Dale's expression
and his gayness were inseparable.'96
C. Dale, Closeted Identity and the Perpetuation of Social Inequality
The Court fails to treat Dale's sexuality-related expression as
connected to his sexual identity. Instead, the expressive dimensions of
Dale's identity bolstered the Boy Scouts' expressive association
defense, rather than providing him the intended protection of the New
Jersey civil rights law."' The Court thus conditions equality on the
silencing of subjugated classes' 8--which directly contradicts gay and
lesbian equality efforts and the scope of equality defined by the statute
at issue in the litigation.!9 Because Dale's expression constituted and
195. PHELAN, supra note 190, at 52.
196. There are several works on the social construction of sexual identity. See, e.g.,
FoRMs OF DEsIRE: SEXuAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CoNSTRucTIONIST CONTROVERSY
(Edward Stein ed., 1990); PHELAN, supra note 190; Carole S. Vance, Social Construction
Theory: Problems in the History of Sexuality, in HOMOsEXUALIrY, WHICH HoMOsExuALITY'?
ESSAYS FROM THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES 13 (Dennis
Altman et al. eds., 1988); Larry CatA Backer, Constructing a "Homosexual" for
Constitutional Theory: Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and
British Courts, 71 TuL. L. REv. 529 (1996); Chesire Calhoun, Denaturalizing and
Desexualizing Lesbian and Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REv 1859 (1993); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., Review Essay: A Social Constructionist Critique of Posner's Sex and Reason: Steps
Toward a Gaylegal Agenda, 102 YALE L.J. 333 (1992); Halley, supra note 23; Morris B.
Kaplan, Constructing Lesbian and Gay Rights and Liberation, 79 VA. L. REV. 1877 (1993);
Knauer, supra note 131, at 1031-49 (discussing the expressive nature of nonheterosexual
identity); Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the
Politics of Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833 (1993); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Reason, Tradition,
and Family Law" A Comment on Social Constructionism, 79 VA. L. REv. 1515 (1993);.
197. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653-54, 661.
198. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 123-24 (arguing that a constitutional theory
that permits outness discrimination legitimates class-based discrimination against gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals).
199. The NJLAD prohibits discrimination on the basis of "affectional or sexual
orientation" in places of public accommodation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West Supp. 2001).
The statute defines affectional or sexual orientation as "male or female heterosexuality,
homosexuality or bisexuality by inclination, practice, identity or expression, having a history
thereof or being perceived, presumed or identified by others as having such an orientation."
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constructed his identity, it warranted protection under the antidiscrimi-
nation statute.
The recognition of expressive identity, however, does not mean
that forms of identity expression will necessarily supplant an
organization's right of expressive association."' The Roberts
framework makes clear that the right of expressive association allows
an organization to exclude persons whose political commitments
would impair the group's ability to conduct effectively its expressive
activities."' Thus, the Roberts doctrine compels judicial consideration
of Dale's expressive activities. Dale, however, remains flawed because
its dichotomization of speech and identity could unduly restrict
equality in the broader civil rights context and in the specific realm of
public accommodations litigation.
1. Dale Limits Equality in the Broader Civil Rights Context
The Court's disaggregation of expression and speech has
troubling implications for the broader context of equality litigation. If
the Court adheres strictly to its clinical conception of identity and its
legitimization of outness discrimination, discriminators in lawsuits that
do not implicate a First Amendment defense, such as public and
private employment discrimination and equal protection cases, could
disclaim any intention to exclude gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and
transgender people based on status alone. Relying on Dale's severing
of speech and identity, these defendants could potentially shield their
discrimination by framing it as the "permissible" exclusion of an
individual's conduct or speech, rather than discrimination on account
of their constitutionally or statutorily protected status. Because a
Id. § 10:5-5hh (emphasis added). Although the statute lists identity and expression as
separate categories, it provides a remedy for discrimination on the basis of outness.
200. See Hunter, supra note 23, at 20 (arguing that the recognition of speech as
identity does not answer the question of whether a defendant can successfully advance an
expressive association defense).
201. See supra Part II.B.3.
202. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 124 ("The doctrinal treatment of outness
discrimination as a permissible form of discrimination, one distinct from gay and lesbian
discrimination, would severely complicate gay rights efforts and provide discriminators xvith a
convenient route to avoid compliance with civil rights regulations."). Many scholars have
criticized antidiscrimination jurisprudence for often failing to recognize the cultural and
expressive dimensions of identity and thus legitimating a host of discriminatory practices.
See, e.g., Peter Brandon Bayer, Mutable Charactefistics and the Definition of Discrimination
Under Title VII, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REv 769, 839 (1987) (arguing that "[i]ndividuals ...
conceive their special identities through a vide amalgam of acts" and, consequently, "we
must criticize the cavalier fashion Nvith which courts dismiss individuals' claims that
employers' racially, sexually, or ethnically premised rules unjustly restrict personal integrity
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heteronormative social structure views expressions of gay and lesbian
sexuality as departures from "correct" or "normal" culture, ideology,
and politics0 3 antidiscrimination jurisprudence that legitimizes the
subordination of such expression will simply reinforce heterosexism
and limit the achievement of social equality.
2. Dale Limits Equality in the Public Accommodations Context
The Court's separation of outness and identity also restricts the
achievement of equality in the context of public accommodations
litigation, where an association might have a more credible First
Amendment defense. The Roberts doctrine allows associations to
justify a policy of discrimination against a protected class of
individuals by linking such discrimination to the pursuit of a clear
expressive goal.2"' This test recognizes that the inclusion of certain
undesired individuals may impede the group's ability to express the
very ideas that its members associate to express."05 The Dale decision
and expression"); Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of
Race and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366-67, 371-81, 385-88 (criticizing courts for not
treating employers' regulation of black women's physical appearance in the workplace as a
form of racial, gender, and cultural domination); Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the
Garcfa Cousins Lost Their Accents: Understanding the Language of Title VI Decisions
Approving English-Only Rules as the Product of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and
Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REv. 1347, 1367-72 (1997) (arguing that courts fail to treat
employers' Spanish language discrimination as a manifestation of national origin
discrimination because they do not appreciate the centrality of Spanish language in
constructing Latino/a identity); Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference
in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL. L. REV 1923, 2008 (2000) (arguing that the
doctrinal treatment of "race as an immutable trait means that merely 'cultural' behaviors and
practices do not receive legal protection unless they can be strongly linked back to the
'immutable' characteristics of race or national origin" and that "[t]he separation of'race' from
'culture' ... gives employers and government agencies broad room to force employees
marked as racially 'other' to assimilate to a socially 'white' standard").
203. Heterosexuality forms the hidden norm of cultural and political expression in
heterosexist society. See FEAR OFA QUEER PLANET: QUEER POLmCS AND SOCIAL THEORY, at
xxi (Michael Warner ed., 1993) ("Het[erosexual] culture thinks of itself as the elemental form
of human association, as the very model of inter-gender relations, as the indivisible basis of
all community, and as the means of reproduction without which society wouldn't exist');
Fajer, supra note 165, at 602 ("In everyday public life, we are bombarded with people
asserting, directly and indirectly, their non-gay sexual orientation.... Given the strong non-
gay presumptions that exist in our culture, most people assume that public allusions to sex,
intimate association, and desire refer to non-gay interactions:'). For a general discussion of
heteronormativity in social theory, see FEAR OFA QUEER PLANET, supra, at xxi-xxv.
204. Roberts v: US. Jaycees, 468 US. 609, 622-23 (1984); see supra Part I.B.
205. In Roberts, the Court held that:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs
of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does
not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the original members to
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points to James Dale's identity-linked expression and finds that such
expression justifies the Boy Scouts' concern that he will impede the
organization's pursuit of an allegedly heterosexist agenda."6 The
opinion explains that Dale's outness would compel the Boy Scouts "to
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that [the
organization] accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of
behavior' '0 7 The decision also distinguishes Dale's outness from mere
membership in a class that the state civil rights statute protects."'
Yet, as the social constructionist theory demonstrates, Dale's gay
identity and his expression are irreversibly intertwined. Accordingly,
when the Court enshrines the Boy Scouts' outness discrimination with
constitutional protection, it condones the exclusion of gays, lesbians,
bisexuals, and transgender people, as such, from the organization,"'
despite holding that the expressive association defense would not
shield such blanket discrimination. l
Furthermore, the Court openly embraces status-based discrimina-
tion when it rejects Dale's argument that the Boy Scouts does not really
condemn homosexuality or need to exclude individuals who advocate
antiheterosexist positions because the organization does not expel
heterosexuals who oppose homophobic discrimination."' The Court
dismisses this evidence, arguing that "[t]he presence of an avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster's
uniform sends a distinctly different message from the presence of a
heterosexual assistant scoutmaster who is on record as disagreeing
with Boy Scouts policy'2 1 2 Even assuming a possible separation of
express only those views that brought them together. Freedom of association
therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.
468 U.S. at 623.
206. Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640,653-56 (2000).
207. Id. at 653.
208. Id. at 653-54.
209. See Hunter, supra note 23, at 19-20 (discussing Hurley's holding that parade
organizers could exclude the "message" of the gay and lesbian group and arguing that "[t]o
exclude that message is to exclude that identity, as it is the full identity claim that makes
equality a meaningful concept"); Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 123-24 (arguing that the
parade organizers' exclusion of the gay and lesbian group's "message" in Hurley "constituted
an act of discrimination based on gay, lesbian and bisexual identity").
210. Dale, 530 U.S. at 653 ("That is not to say that an expressive association can erect
a shield against discrimination laws simply by asserting that mere acceptance of a member
from a particular group would impair its message.").
211. Id. at 655 ("In this same vein, Dale makes much of the claim that the Boy Scouts
does not revoke the membership of heterosexual Scout leaders that openly disagree with the
Boy Scouts' policy on sexual orientation. But if this is true, it is irrelevant").
212. Id at 655-56.
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speech and identity, if the Boy Scouts' homophobic discrimination
relates solely to speech or viewpoint, rather than to identity, then the
Court's distinction between openly pro-gay heterosexuals and out gays
is both unwarranted and unprincipled. The only difference between
the gay and heterosexual "speakers" is their sexual identity, but the
Court's own analysis purports to disapprove of mere class-based
discrimination. Moreover, the Dale opinion does not contemplate any
circumstances where an "avowed homosexual" like pro-gay
heterosexuals, would not threaten the Boy Scouts' speech."3 Thus,
while the Court maintains that it has only legitimized a narrow band of
discrimination based on viewpoint, it has in fact endorsed class-based
discrimination, which frustrates the goal of social equality."4
3. The Combined Effect of Dale's Deference to Discriminators and
the Separation of Speech and Identity Seriously Threatens Social
Equality
Dale's negative impact upon the achievement of social equality is
most readily seen when one considers the combined effect of its novel,
deferential evidentiary analysis and its disaggregation of speech and
identity. The Court's newly minted deference standard lowers the
evidentiary burden required of discriminators seeking to prove both the
content of, and threats to, their expressive activities." In addition, the
Court has deemed outness discrimination a permissible basis for
exclusion, if the discriminator engages in heterosexist expression."
As a result of these two holdings, organizations have much more room
to engage in homophobic discrimination. Now, an association need
only point to ambiguous evidence, a significant portion of which could
involve post-litigation statements, to establish that it disapproves of
nonheterosexual intimacy and then simply argue that the victims of its
discrimination are openly gay and, thus, a threat to the effectuation of
the group's amorphous heterosexist message. Even a narrow reading
of Dale would substantiate an expressive association defense under this
213. See id. at 656; see also Hunter, supra note 23, at 21-22 (criticizing the Court for
conflating identity with First Amendment advocacy).
214. The fact that expression constitutes identity does not mean that a place of public
accommodation cannot exclude the individuals engaged in such expression. The Dale
decision, however, finds that outness alone proves the Boy Scouts' expressive association
defense. See Dale, 530 US. at 655-56. The dissent, by contrast, attempts to determine
whether Dale's speech actually interferes with the Boy Scouts' mission. Id. at 683-98
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
215. See supra Part I.C.
216. See supra Part I.A.
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hypothetical scenario, for an association that merely engages in
"some" speech can prove an expressive association defense under the
Court's deferential analysis."7 Dale, if strictly followed, would permit
almost any association that engages in some murky speech to exclude
openly gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. The
decision thus imperils the enforcement of laws that seek to protect gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people from discrimination.21 '
IV THE CLOSETING OF DISAGREEMENT WITH THE ROBERTS
DOCTRINEAND INSENSITIVITY TO "GAY RIGHTS"
A. The Closeting ofDisagreement with the Roberts Doctrine
The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that Dale significantly
departs from the evidentiary and equality concerns pursued by the
Roberts doctrine. In the Roberts line of cases, the Court engaged in a
careful analysis of the organizations' claims that their discrimination
furthered expressive interests and that the forced inclusion of protected
classes of persons in the associations would frustrate their speech.'
The Roberts standard required that courts closely examine the
evidentiary record to determine the exact nature of the defendants'
asserted expressive activities and to discover whether enforcement of a
civil rights statute would complicate these interests.22 In Dale, the
Court greatly lessens the evidentiary burden on civil rights defendants,
and it narrowly defines sexual identity as existing apart from
expression or conduct, the latter of which associations could freely
exclude under an expressive association rationale.' The Court
employed a similarly lax evidentiary standard in Hurley, though
perhaps with greater justification than Dale, holding that "a narrow,
217. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 655 ("[A]ssociations do not have to associate for the
'purpose' of disseminating a certain message in order to be entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. An association must merely engage in expressive activity that could be
impaired in order to be entitled to protection:').
218. Id at 701-02 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that "no group can claim a right of
expressive association without identifying a clear position to be advocated over time in an
unequivocal way" and that "[t]o require less, and to allow exemption from a public
accommodations statute based on any individual's difference from an alleged group ideal,
however expressed and however inconsistently claimed, would convert the fight of expressive
association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination laW' (emphasis added)); cf
Gretchen Van Ness, Parades and Prejudice: The Incredible True Story of Bostons St.
Patrick's Day Parade and the United States Supreme Cour4 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 625, 660
(1996) (arguing that the "implications" of a strict application of Hurley are "staggering").
219. See supra Part lI.B.3.
220. See id.
221. See supra 106-163 and accompanying text.
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succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional
protection." The Hurley decision also severed sexual identity from
expression and action, adopting a static and clinical conception of
sexuality.' Thus, in two gay and lesbian equality cases, the Court has
applied a more deferential evidentiary standard when considering First
Amendment defenses against the application of state public
accommodations statutes.
Despite the significant differences between the Dale and Hurley
decisions and the Roberts trilogy, neither Dale nor Hurley attempted to
isolate problems associated with the Roberts test, nor did the Court
express any explicit disapproval of the Roberts line of cases."4 In fact,
the Court cites to Roberts as relevant precedent in Dale," and it
attempted to place its rulings in both cases within the Roberts
framework despite the fact that Hurley was decided primarily as a
"free speech" rather than an "expressive association' case."' Yet, a
majority of the Court abandons the essential elements of the Roberts
doctrine in Dale, and in Hurley a unanimous Court failed to apply the
fundamentals of Roberts. In neither case did the Court analyze the
more stringent evidentiary requirements of the Roberts doctrine, nor
did the Court attempt to reconcile its new deferential analysis with the
Roberts framework."' The fact that the Court has applied a different
standard than Roberts in the two most recent cases raising speech
defenses suggests that the Court has in fact "quietly" overruled the
Roberts doctrine.
222. Hurley v. ish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995). Hurley may have had a stronger doctrinal footing to apply this more lenient standard.
Once the Court concluded that the parade and its individual units were speakers, then it could
logically conclude that the components of the parade's "message," however amorphous, were
determined by which units were allowed to participate. See id at 568-70. For a criticism of
this view, see Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 110-13 (criticizing Hurley's departure from
Roberts' articulable message requirement).
223. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572 (making a distinction between excluding gays and
lesbians "as such" and excluding them from a parade as a "parade unit carrying [a] banner").
224. See generally Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 657-59 (discussing the
appropriate standard of review); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 572, 580 (discussing Roberts and N.Y
State Club Ass'n decisions).
225. See, e.g., Dale, 530 US. at 657-59 (discussing provisions of Roberts).
226. See id. (discussing provisions of Roberts); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580 (holding that
outcome of case would not differ under Roberts doctrine). Although Hurley abandoned the
expressive association framework utilized in the lower courts, the Court nevertheless held,
alternatively, that its decision would not differ under the Roberts doctrine. Id.
227. See generally Dale, 530 US. at 657-59 (discussing the appropriate standard of
review); Hurley, 515 US. at 572, 580 (discussing Roberts and N.Y State Club Ass'n
decisions).
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It is not immediately clear why the Court would not openly
express its disagreement with the Roberts doctrine. One explanation,
however, appears plausible: the Court may want to hide its
disagreement with Roberts in order to embrace facially the principles
of stare decisis and constitutional fidelity. As the decision in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey demonstrates, the
Court places, at least rhetorically, a premium on fidelity to precedent. "
Accordingly, the Court might not want to overrule explicitly the
Roberts line of cases absent a compelling justification. 9 The Court's
closeting of its apparent disapproval of the Roberts doctrine, however,
makes its own jurisprudence dishonest and creates confusion among
the lower courts." ° In both Hurley and Dale, for example, the state
appellate and supreme courts issued opinions that conformed to
Roberts' more stringent evidentiary analysis."' The Court ultimately
reversed these decisions, but it never overruled the doctrinal
framework employed by the lower courts. The Court's "new"
expressive association doctrine, which cites to, yet departs from,
governing precedent, simply clouds what was previously a fairly stable
body of law."2
228. 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) ("[W]e recognize that no judicial system could do
society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in every case that raised it. Indeed, the very concept
of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable:) (citation omitted).
229. Id. (arguing that the necessity for stare decisis would cease to exist "if a prior
judicial ruling should come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement was for that
very reason doomed").
230. Cf id. at 954 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing
that the Casey'joint opinion" claims to adhere to Roe v Wade, 410 US. 113, 162-65 (1973),
but it "instead revises [Roe]" and that as a result "Roe continues to exist, but only in the way
a storefront on a western movie set exists: a mere facade to give the illusion of reality"); id. at
966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[Roe] stands as a sort of
judicial Potemldn Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a monument to the
importance of adhering to precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new method of
analysis.., is imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion').
231. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 734 A.2d 1196, 1219-29 (N.J. 1999), rev't 530
US. 640 (2000) (applying Roberts and finding that the defendant's exclusion of openly gay
individuals did not relate to any expressive activities of the association); Irish-American Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Group v. City of Boston, 636 N.E.2d 1293, 1298-1300 (Mass. 1994),
rev'd sub nora. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 580
(1995) (applying Roberts and upholding the lower court's conclusion that the defendant's
exclusion of gay, lesbian, and bisexual group from parade did not further a clear expressive
purpose).
232. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 987-88 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (criticizing "joint opinion" for creating confusion by purporting to uphold Roe but
creating a new standard).
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B. The Closeting of Insensitivity to "Gay Rights"
In addition to hiding its opposition to Roberts, the Court also
obscures several of the justices' disagreement with efforts to attain
equality for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. A
number of commentators have provided extensive documentation of
the history of judicial hostility to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender plaintiffs and to their claims for equality.z" The work of
Patricia Cain, for example, catalogues the role of courts in sustaining
heterosexist domination.' Potentially, judicial intolerance toward, or
misunderstanding of, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
experiences can negatively affect queer plaintiffs in any type of
litigation or criminal proceeding."
The Supreme Court is not immune from displaying antigay
hostility. Several justices, particularly members of the Dale majority,
have expressed their strong disapproval of gay and lesbian equality and
have disparaged claims that the Constitution stands as a bar to
governmental discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and to
governmental infringement of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
sexual autonomy."
Justice Scalia, for example, wrote a stinging dissent in Romer v
Evans in which he passionately contested a construction of the Equal
Protection Clause that would invalidate heterosexist state laws. 37 In
Romer, a majority of the Court applied "rational basis review"' 8 and
233. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal
Histoy, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551 (1993); Fajer, supra note 165; Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-
Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTiNGS
L. 799, 805-37 (1979); Amy D. Ronner, Bottoms v. Bottoms: The Lesbian Mother and the
Judicial Perpetuation of Damaging Stereotypes, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 341 (1995); Robert
G. Bagnall et al., Comment, Burdens on Gay Litigants and Bias in the Court System:
Homosexual Panic, Child Custody, and Anonymous Parties, 19 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 497
(1984); Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter The Homosexual
Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REv 133, 147-78 (1992).
234. See Cain, supra note 233.
235. See, e.g., Mison, supra note 233 (discussing criminal law jurisprudence that
legitimates homophobic violence); Ronner, supra note 233 (discussing judicial biases against
gay and lesbian parents).
236. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,636-52 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
237. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Several commentators have argued that the Court applied a level of review that is
"stronger" than traditional rationality analysis. See, e.g., Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose
Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv 297, 327 (1997) (including Romer on a
list of cases representing "rational basis [review] with [a] bite" (citation omitted)); Michael
Stokes Paulsen, Medium Rare Scrutiny, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 397, 399 (1998) (same); John
H. Turner, Solid Waste Flow Control: The Commerce Clause and Beyond 19 MIss. C. L.
REv 53, 90 (1998) ("Romer is, therefore, not simply a victory for gay rights advocates-it is
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invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that repealed and
banned the enactment of laws that prohibited discrimination against
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals. 39 Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, chastised the majority of the Court for
treating, from his perspective, homophobic animus as strongly as
"racial or religious bias' 40 Justice Scalia described "homosexuals" as
a "politically powerful" and wealthy class that had aggressively utilized
the political process to obtain full legal protection for its aberrant
sexual practice."' Justice Scalia construed the state constitutional
provision as a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to
preserve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically
powerful minority to revise those mores through use of the laws." '42
Justice Scalia's arguments deny the existence of gay and lesbian
subordination, and they invert the social reality of heterosexist
domination. His analysis falsely describes gays, lesbians, and
bisexuals as a socially privileged class with a dominant voice in state
and local politics. 43 Justice Scalia's erasure and denial of homophobic
subjugation allows him to misportray the heterosexist law as an
an unequivocal and triumphant return to the 'rational basis with bite' approach:'). For a
general discussion of "rational basis with bite," see Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis
with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny byAny Other Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
239. The now-invalidated amendment provided that:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute
or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or
claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of
discrimination.
See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 (emphasis added).
240. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Because the Court only applied rational basis
review ("with a bite" or otherwise), it did not treat antigay discrimination as seriously as it
does racial or religious bias.
241. Justice Scalia argued that
because those who engage in homosexual conduct tend to reside in
disproportionate numbers in certain communities, have high disposable income,
and, of course, care about homosexual-rights issues much more ardently than the
public at large, they possess political power much greater than their numbers, both
locally and statewide. Quite understandably, they devote this political power to
achieving not merely a grudging social toleration, but full social acceptance, of
homosexuality.
Id. at 645-46 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
242. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
243. See Jane S. Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States: Decoding the
Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARv C.R.-C.L. L. REv 283, 291 (1994) (arguing that antigay
rhetoric "depicts comfortable gay and lesbian lives").
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innocent and constitutionally permissible attempt to restore balance in
the democratic process. Justice Scalia's obfuscation of heterosexist
domination also permits him to challenge generally the notion that
gays and lesbians need judicial solicitude to guard against prejudice in
the political process.2" Justice Scalia's rejection of a constitutional
basis for gay and lesbian equality rests firmly upon a patently untrue
premise: the notion that gays and lesbians are a socially dominant
group.2
45
In a passage that is, perhaps, most indicative of his hostility to
gay and lesbian equality, Justice Scalia characterizes the Colorado
amendment as the result of a presumably harmless Kulturkampf, rather
than an attempt by Colorado voters to harm unilaterally gays, lesbians,
244. See URVASHI VAIm, VIRTuAL EQUALITY. THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION 250-52 (1995) (observing that antigay and lesbian political campaigns
falsely advance the notion of gay wealth in order to disparage gay and lesbian civil rights
efforts); Hutchinson, Ignoring the Sexualization of Race, supra note 168, at 69 (arguing that
antigay discourse claims that "gays, lesbians, bisexuals and the transgendered do not need
civil rights protection because they lead comfortable lives, are wealthy and powerful, and
have the ability to conceal their sexual identity and evade discrimination" (citations omitted));
Schacter, supra note 243, at 291-92 (arguing that "opponents of gay civil rights claim that gay
men and lesbians are economically well-off and therefore do not need legal protection"). See
generally Hutchinson, "Gay Rights" for "Gay Whites," supra note 168, at 1368-82
(discussing the social construction of gays and lesbians as white and wealthy and analyzing
the impact of this stereotype upon civil rights discourse).
245. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the false notion of gay and
lesbian power). The false construction of subjugated classes as "powerful" by opponents of
civil rights enforcement and perpetrators of oppressive violence has a long history. See
HAROLD E. QUINLEY & CHARLES Y. GLOCK, ANTI-SEMITISM IN AMERICA 2-10 (2d ed. 1983)
(describing stereotypes of Jews as "monied" and "power hungry"); Robert S. Chang, Toward
an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, Post-Structuralism, and
Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REv 1241, 1258-59 (1993) (discussing stereotypes of Asian
Americans as "hardworking, intelligent, and successful" and arguing that such stereotyping
"permits the general public, government officials, and the judiciary to ignore or marginalize
the contemporary needs of Asian Americans"); Note, Racial Violence Against Asian
Americans, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1926, 1931 & nn.37-38 (1993) (discussing anti-Asian
American stereotypes and observing that "Asian Americans are seen as unfair competitors
vho pose an unwelcome economic threat"). As early as 1883, the Supreme Court described
antiracist laws as "special" handouts to blacks. In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 US. 3 (1883),
the Court invalidated a federal public accommodations law as exceeding the scope of
congressional power. Id at 23-25. Justice Bradley's opinion in the Civil Rights Cases
questions the need for civil rights protection for blacks:
When a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid of beneficent legislation has
shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that state, there must be some stage in
the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere citizen, and ceases to
be the special favorite of the laws ....
Id. at 25.
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or bisexuals. 46 He also contends that this Kulturkampf does not trigger
constitutional concerns. 47 The term Kulturkampf refers broadly to
"any struggle between groups over a common national culture. It
presupposes both the existence of social groups with distinct identities
and conflicts between them over values, status, power, and authority.242
Originally, Kulturkampf described the attempt by German nationalists,
led by Otto von Bismarck, to quash the growing political power of the
Catholic Church in the late-nineteenth century.49 Both definitions of a
Kulturkampf implicate human rights concerns, Justice Scalia's
statements notwithstanding."0  Justice Scalia demonizes and
marginalizes gay and lesbian equality efforts by dismissing
heterosexism as harmless and beyond a constitutional remedy.
Justice Scalia, again with Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, also dissented from the Court's grant of certiorari in Equality
Foundation v City of Cincinnati, a case involving a city ordinance that,
like the Colorado amendment, bans the enactment of laws or policies
prohibiting discrimination against gays and lesbians. 5' A majority of
the Court vacated a court of appeals decision upholding the statute and
remanded the case for a decision in light of Romer, which was decided
246. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The Court has mistaken a
Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amendment before us here is not the
manifestation of a 'bare... desire to harm' homosexuals... " (quotations omitted)).
247. See id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Colorado's opposition to gay and
lesbian equality "and the means chosen to achieve it, are ... unimpeachable under any
constitutional doctrine hitherto pronounced.").
248. J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106YALEL.J. 2313, 2319 (1997).
249. Seeid. at2318-19&n.17.
250. As Professor Balkin has argued,
Scalia was right to see Romer as part of a larger struggle over morality and
culture. But he was wrong to think that the Constitution is necessarily silent in
such a struggle. Just as the original Kulturkampf in Germany implicated human
rights questions, so too group conflict over social status and moral authority is one
of the deep concerns of the Constitution. The question is not whether the
Constitution is implicated in cultural struggles, but how it is implicated.
Id. at 2319. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder andAmendment 2: Romer Rightness, 95
MICH. L. REv 203, 208-21 (1996) (arguing that the constitutional prohibition of "bills of
attainder" provides a constitutional tradition for legitimating Romer decision).
251. 518 US. 1001, 1001 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). The ordinance provides that
The City of Cincinnati and its various Boards and Commissions may not
enact, adopt, enforce or administer any ordinance, regulation, rule or policy which
provides that homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, status, conduct, or
relationship constitutes, entitles, or otherwise provides a person with the basis to
have any claim of minority or protected status, quota preference or other
preferential treatment.
Equal. Foundation v. City of Cincinnati, 128 E3d 289,291 (6th Cir. 1997).
2001] BOY SCOUTS v. DALE
during the pendency of the petition for certiorari." Justice Scalia
dissented and argued against any construction of the Equal Protection
Clause that would void laws, like those in Romer and Equality
Foundation, that strip and deprive gays and lesbians of statutory civil
rights protection." Justice Scalia framed the issue as one of
democratic theory and, siding with the heterosexist majority,
concluded that "[u]nelected heads of city departments and agencies,
who are in other respects (as democratic theory requires) subject to the
control of the people, must, where special protection for homosexuals
are [sic] concerned, be permitted to do what they please."" Justice
Scalia's analysis in Equality Foundation, together with his position in
Romer, clearly indicates that he will not support a construction of the
Equal Protection Clause (or Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause) as
prohibiting homophobic discrimination. Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Thomas' general opposition to antiheterosexist
legal reform efforts likely informs their analysis in Dale."5
252. See Equal. Foundation, 518 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting). On remand, the
court of appeals sustained the ordinance. See Equal. Foundation, 128 E3d at 301.
253. See Equal. Foundation, 518 U.S. at 1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
254. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Scalia argued that the notion
that the homophobic ordinance violated the constitution was "an absurd proposition:' Id.
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
255. Several commentators have argued that the Romer decision is a "gay rights
victory" See, e.g., Robert D. Dodson, Homosexual Discrimination and Gender. Was Romer
v. Evans Really a Victory for Gay Rights?, 35 CAL. W L. REv 271, 272 (1999) (observing
that "[c]ommentators heralded [Romer] as a victory for gay rights"); Andrew M. Jacobs,
Romer Wasn't Built in a Day: The Subtle Transformation in Judicial Argument Over Gay
Rights, 1996 Wis. L. REV 893, 951-69 (praising Romeras a decision that marks a break from
judicial homophobia and which could signal the demise of a variety of heterosexist laws). On
the surface, these arguments seemingly complicate my claim that members of the Court are
insensitive to gay and lesbian equality. For the following reasons, however, this assertion is
unsound. First, this Article has carefully identified specific justices who have expressed
hostility to gay and lesbian equality. Second, Romer itself only applied "rational basis
review"; thus, it does not implicate broader homophobic discrimination. See Dodson, supra,
at 285 (arguing that the Court "side stepped" the issue of heightened scrutiny in Romer).
Third, Romer involved discrimination on the basis of an abstract "homosexual" status. See
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 629-35 (1996). Although the infirm amendment in Romer
focuses on "sexual orientation" and "conduct, practices, or relationships," the decision does
not address a cause of action by a plaintiff who has "expressed" his or her identity, and the
opinion focuses on "traits" rather than activity. See id at 624, 633 (arguing that the state
constitutional amendment violates equal protection in part because "[ilt identifies persons by
a single trait and then denies them protection across the board (emphasis added)). Dale and
Hurley demonstrate that the Court does not recognize queerness in practice or as a lived
quantity. See supra notes 149-188 and accompanying text. Romer's focus on sexual "traits"
could reflect and reinforce this flawed jurisprudence. See Janet E. Halley, Romer v
Hardwick, 68 U COLO. L. REv. 429, 438-45 (1997) (arguing that Romer focused on gay and
lesbian "status" but not "conduct").
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In the privacy context, Bowers v Hardiwick, which constitutiona-
lizes governmental proscriptions of "homosexual sodomy'"56 remains a
much disparaged case among legal commentators.27 In Hardwick, the
Court held that gay and lesbian sexuality is unconnected to substantive
due process precedent that recognizes individual autonomy in areas of
sexuality, reproduction, family planning, and marriage."' The decision
legitimizes heteronormative familial and sexual structures in its
conclusion that nonheterosexual intimacy, at least "homosexual
sodomy," falls outside the scope of fundamental personal liberty and is,
therefore, subject to state suppressionY9  Two members of the Dale
majority--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor-joined the
majority in Hardwick 2'  Furthermore, Justice Scalia's dissent in
Romer cites Hardwick approvingly and argues that the latter decision
precludes judicial invalidation of heterosexist legislation under an
equal protection analysis. 6' Justice Scalia's invocation of Hardwick in
256. 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986) (holding that the Constitution does not "extend a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy").
257. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, Gay Men and Lesbians Down by Law in the 1990Ms
USA: The Continuing Toll ofBowers v. Hardwick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV 1, 10 (1994)
("The inescapable conclusion is that the result in Hardwick is about homophobia... "'); Janet
E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79
VA. L. REv 1721, 1750-68 (1993) (criticizing as flawed the Court's historical analysis in
Hardwick); Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. Ray. 737, 799-802 (1989)
(arguing that Hardwick denies gays and lesbians the ability to define their "personhood");
Thomas B. Stoddard, Bowers v. Hardwick: Precedent by Personal Predilection, 54 U. CHI. L.
REV. 648, 655 (1987) (criticizing the "utter lack of reasoning" in Hardwick and arguing that
the "explanation" for the opinion "lies in the emotional response of five justices to the subject
matter underlying the case as they perceived it, or rather, as they reconstituted it: the subject
of homosexuality"); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical Reading of
Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV 1805, 1828 (1993) (arguing that the Hardwick decision
"does not calmly reason about homosexuality, but rather rages irrationally against it" and that
the decision "discursively makes and marks the sexual difference between heterosexuality
and homosexuality that makes homophobia possible ... [and] does not merely reflect the
constitutional legitimacy of the politics of homophobia but, more importantly, is itself an
instance of the paranoid juridical forms that politics sometimes takes").
258. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91 (holding that "none of the rights announced in [the
Court's privacy jurisprudence] bears any resemblance to the claimed constitutional right of
homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy that is asserted in this case" because "[n]o
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity
on the other has been demonstrated").
259. See Dunlap, supra note 257, at 10 (describing Hardwick as judicial homophobia);
Stoddard, supra note 257, at 655 (same); Thomas, supra note 257, at 1828 (same).
260. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 187. Although Justice O'Conner would later join the
Romer majority, see Romer, 517 U.S. at 621, this case is not necessarily a "gay rights
victory." See sources cited supra note 255. This observation also applies to Justice Kennedy,
who authored Romer, but joined the Dale majority.
261. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 630, 640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Hardwick decision is "unassailable, except by those who think that the Constitution changes
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majority maintains that its own personal position with respect to the
morality of "homosexual conduct" does not impact its decision.267 The
majority discusses political debates over the social status of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals in response to Justice
Stevens' observation in his dissenting opinion that traditional ways of
thinking about sexual minorities "have modified" over time.2 ' Justice
Stevens examines "modifications" in attitudes toward gays and
lesbians to argue that the Court has a duty to guard against the "harm"
caused by prejudice. '69 The majority contests the relevance of social
and judicial attitudes concerning homosexuality, arguing:
We are not, as we must not be, guided by our views of whether the
Boy Scouts' teachings with respect to homosexual conduct are right or
wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization's
expression does not justify the State's effort to compel the organization
to accept members where such acceptance would derogate from the
organization's expressive message. "While the law is free to promote
all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved
message or discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either
purpose may strike the government "'2 70
267. Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 US. 640, 661 (2000).
268. See id. at 699-700 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 660-61 (responding to Justice
Stevens' arguments).
269. Justice Stevens observes:
That [heterosexist] prejudices are still prevalent and that they have caused
serious and tangible harm to countless members of the class New Jersey seeks to
protect are established matters of fact that neither the Boy Scouts nor the Court
disputes. That harm can only be aggravated by the creation of a constitutional
shield for a policy that is itself the product of a habitual way of thinking about
strangers. As Justice Brandeis so wisely advised, "we must be ever on our guard,
lest we erect our prejudices into legal principles."
If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold.
Id. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
270. Id. at 661 (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579). Justice Souter, in his dissent, also
questions the relevance of social attitudes toward gays and lesbians. After he acknowledges
Justice Stevens' observations concerning social stereotyping, Justice Souter argues:
The fact that we are cognizant of this laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on
homosexuality should not, however, be taken to control the resolution of this case.
The right of expressive association does not, of course, turn on the
popularity of the views advanced by a group that claims protection. Whether the
group appears to this Court to be in the vanguard or rearguard of social thinking is
irrelevant to the group's rights.
Id at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, however, concludes that the Boy Scouts has
not substantiated its expressive association defense because the organization has failed "to
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2001] BOY SCOUTS v. DALE
the equal protection context implicates an ongoing debate among legal
scholars and jurists concerning the relevance of Hardwick to gay and
lesbian equal protection claims and regarding the precise boundaries of
the interplay between due process and equal protection.26 Justice
Scalia, however, has taken a clear position against gay and lesbian
equality in his unequivocal approval of Hardwick and in his insistence
that the decision stands as a bar to judicial invalidation of heterosexist
enactments on equal protection grounds.6
Finally, the Court's decision in Hurley, as in Dale, contradicts
contemporary understandings of social identity and gay and lesbian
experience in its separation of outness and status.6 Although Hurley
might have greater legitimacy than Dale on narrow, free speech
grounds,6 the Court's flawed construction of sexual identity could
legitimize (as it does in Dale) outness discrimination in a host of
settings.6  Hurley, therefore, could reflect a judicial view that gay and
lesbian equality should exist in a limited fashion-if at all.
Despite the reality that the judicial process often perpetuates and
legitimizes heterosexist domination and the fact that several justices on
the Court openly oppose gay and lesbian civil rights efforts, the Dale
to suit current fashions" and that the decision is "most relevant" to deciding the equal
protection question in Romer).
262. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CF-. L. REv 1161, 1170-78
(1988) (criticizing the argument that Hardwick precludes the application of equal protection
principles to invalidate antigay laws because due process legitimates traditional norms, while
equal protection marks a departure from such norms); see also infin notes 325-327 and
accompanying text. Compare Padula v. Webster, 822 E2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invoking
Hardwick to reject the argument that gays and lesbians constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect
class and holding that "[i]f the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state
sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious") with Watkins v. United States Army,
847 E2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 875 E2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting argument that Hardwick precludes a finding that gays and lesbians constitute a
quasi-suspect class because Hardwick never "suggests that the state may penalize gays for
their sexual orientation" or "holds that the state may make invidious distinctions when
regulating sexual conduct").
263. See, e.g., Romer, 517 U.S. at 636,640-41 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
264. See supra Part m.A-B.
265. Eskridge, supra note 165, at 2463 (arguing that courts should "cautiously" apply
Hurley); Hunter, supra note 23, at 18 ("If one accepts, as the Court did, that the issue [in
Hurley] was whether parade organizers could be required 'to include among the marchers a
group imparting a message the organizers do not want to convey,' then the First Amendment
trumping of the equality claim is almost self-evident" (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 559));
Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 113 (arguing that courts should limit Hurleyto its facts and that
the case should not control the outcome of litigation such as Dale); see also supra note 222
and accompanying text (distinguishing Hurley from Dale).
266. See supra Part IlI.C.
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The majority's assertion that it must assess the Boy Scouts'
speech claim without considering the "rightfilness" of the
organization's viewpoints is generally legitimate."' The majority,
however, does not establish that it, in fact, has not allowed judicial
biases to dictate the outcome of the decision. While the Court
admonishes the dissenters not to evaluate the Boy Scouts' defense
through the lense of personal bias, the majority does not convincingly
demonstrate its own purported "neutrality" with respect to gay and
lesbian equality. Indeed, several factors suggest that members of the
majority were motivated by an opposition to gay and lesbian equality.
These factors include: the long history of judicial hostility to gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender plaintiffs, judicial insensitivity to
gay and lesbian equality efforts, the sudden-yet quiet-doctrinal shift
in Dale away from existing precedent that is more favorable to James
Dale's claim, and the previous, oppositional positions that several
justices in the majority have taken in cases litigating gay and lesbian
equality and sexual autonomy."' It is reasonable, if not likely, that Dale
hides the Court's insensitivity toward, and misunderstanding of, gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender existence behind a "neutral" mantra
of "liberty" and "free speech'" As jurists and scholars as diverse as
Justice Holmes,2"' Judge Learned Hand,2 4 Justice Scalia, 5 Justice
make sexual orientation the subject of any unequivocal advocacy, using the channels it
customarily employs to state its message." Id.
271. See id. (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts cannot determine an
association's rights based on judges' own personal views of the association's viewpoints).
While courts cannot penalize an organization that endorses prejudice, the fact that an
organization discriminates against socially subordinate groups that have historically endured
"irrelevant" exclusion might have some bearing on the credibility of the organization's speech
defense. See infra notes 295-299 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 233-266 and accompanying text.
273. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the members of the majority for employing their own beliefs in laissez-faire
economic theory to invalidate state economic regulation under a due process analysis).
274. Judge Learned Hand eloquently unveils the reality ofjudicial subjectivity:
[J]udges are seldom content merely to annul the particular solution before them;
they do not, indeed they may not, say that taking all things into consideration, the
legislators' solution is too strong for the judicial stomach. On the contrary they
wrap up their veto in a protective veil of adjectives such as "arbitrary" "artificial,"
"normal," "reasonable," "inherent," "fundamental," or "essential," whose office
usually, though quite innocently, is to disguise what they are doing and impute to it
a derivation far more impressive than their personal preferences, which are all that
in fact lie behind the decision.
LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70 (1958).
275. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127-28 n.6 (1989) (plurality)
(criticizing the "general" concept of liberty advanced by Justice Brennan and arguing instead
that in a substantive due process analysis judges must define tradition at its "most specific"
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Brennan,"6 legal realists, 7' feministsy 8 critical race theorists,"' and
critical legal studies scholars... have argued, in whole or in part,
level because "general traditions ... permit judges to dictate rather than discern the society's
views").
276. Justice Brennan responds to Justice Scalia's arguments in Michael H. concerning
the process for defining rights. Justice Brennan argues that a strict, specific construction of
liberty simply ratifies biases:
In a community such as ours, "liberty" must include the freedom not to conform.
The plurality today squashes this freedom by requiring specific approval from
history before protecting anything in the name of liberty.
The document that the plurality construes today is unfamiliar to me. It is not
the living charter that I have taken to be our Constitution; it is instead a stagnant,
archaic, hidebound document steeped in the prejudices and superstitions of a time
long past. This Constitution does not recognize that times change, does not see
that sometimes a practice or rule outlives its foundations. I cannot accept an
interpretive method that does such violence to the charter that I am bound by oath
to uphold.
Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
277. See John Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to
Legal Realism, or How Not to Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J.
84, 89 (1995) (arguing that the legal realist indeterminacy thesis "implied that the rules of law
could not constrain judges' choices since it was the judges who chose which rules to apply
and how to apply them" and that "since such choices were necessarily based on the judges'
beliefs about what was right, it was the judges' personal value judgments that consciously or
unconsciously formed the basis of their decisions").
278. See CATHARImn A. MAcKNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 237
(1989) ("In male supremacist societies, the male standpoint dominates civil society in the
form of the objective standard-that standpoint which, because it dominates in the world,
does not appear to function as a standpoint at all.'); Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different
Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 316-17
(1993) ("[T]he law's incorporation of a male normative standard may be invisible but it is not
inconsequential?' (footnote omitted)); Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women s Silence in Law.
The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAMiE L. REV. 886, 888
(1989) ("The body of law about gender discrimination is widely understood to involve
'women's issues'-thus reinforcing the understanding that 'man' is a genderless, standard
creature who does not have to concern himself with gender issues?'); Robin West,
Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHi. L. REv. 1, 60 (1988) (arguing that one "project" of
feminist legal theory is "the unmasking and critiquing of the patriarchy behind purportedly
ungendered law and theory").
279. Richard Delgado, Review Essay: Rodrigo's Fourth Chronicle: Neutrality and
Stasis in Antidiscrimination Law, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1152-53 (1993) ("Facially neutral
laws cannot redress most racism, because of the cultural background against which such laws
operate. But even if we could somehow control for this, formally neutral rules would still fail
to redress racism because of certain structural features of the phenomenon itself." (quotations
omitted)); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind But Now I See". White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Inten 91 MICH. L. REV 953, 957 (1993) (examining the
impact upon the doctrine of the "transparencyphenomenon' or the "tendency of whites not to
think about whiteness, or about norms, behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-
specific"); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REv
1049, 1052-56, 1102-18 (1978) (arguing that the Court has embraced a "perpetrator
perspective" in its antidiscrimination jurisprudence because it fails to examine critically the
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"neutral" legal doctrine often masks a judge's own personal biases and
can reinforce subordination. The argument that judicial opposition to
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality likely influences some
members of the Court in Dale, however, does not imply that every
legal decision, and even all of those involving issues of sexuality, turn
on judicial subjectivity.' Instead, to acknowledge the likely operation
of judicial bias in Dale simply recognizes the explosive social and
political context in which civil rights litigation takes place, 82 the limits
of law as a vehicle for determinate social change,. 3 the ideological
negative effects of "neutral" laws upon the victims of oppression); Neil Gotanda, A Critique
of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind" 44 STAN. L. REV 1, 3 (1991) (examining how color-
blind constitutionalism legitimates racial inequality and domination); Girardeau A. Spann,
Affirmative Action and Discrimination, 39 How. L.J. 1, 72 (1995) (arguing that the "diversion
of resources from racial minorities to whites [effectuated by color-blind jurisprudence] is
good, old-fashioned racial discrimination, pure and simple").
280. Jay M. Feinman & Peter Gabel, Contract Law as Ideology, in THE POLMCS OF
LAW: A PROGRESSiVE CRrrIQuE 373, 382 (David Kairys ed., rev. ed. 1990) ("The central
point to understand... is that contract law today constitutes in large part an elaborate attempt
to conceal what is going on in the world:'); David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH.
L. REV 243, 247 (1984) (arguing that the "results" in legal disputes "come from those same
political, social, moral, and religious value judgments from which the law purports to be
independent"); Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L.
REV. 205, 210 (1979) (arguing that Blackstone's Commentaries are "an instrument of
apology-an attempt to mystify both dominators and dominated by convincing them of the
'naturalness,' the 'freedom' and the 'rationality' of a condition of bondage"); Joseph William
Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1984)
("Those of us associated with Critical Legal Studies believe that law is not apolitical and
objective: Lawyers, judges, and scholars make highly controversial political choices, but use
the ideology of legal reasoning to make our institutions appear natural and our rules appear
neutral.").
281. See CHARLEs LEMERT, POSTMODERNiSM Is NOT WHAT You THaiw 36-53 (1997)
(distinguishing various forms of critical theory and finding a middle-ground in "strategic
postmodemism" that works within "modernity,' but recognizes the complexity and
subjectivity of reason).
282. In NAACP v Button, the Supreme Court characterized racial civil rights litigation
as "political expression":
In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a technique of resolving
private differences; it is a means for achieving the lawful objectives of equality of
treatment by all government, federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro
community in this country. It is thus a form of political expression. Groups which
find themselves unable to achieve their objectives through the ballot frequently
turn to the courts.
371 U.S. 415,429 (1963).
283. One commentator has examined the limits of litigating equality in the context of
feminism:
Feminism today, like the broader civil rights movement, is facing up to the
limits of the law as a vehicle of social change. Many institutions of private power
have proved effectively beyond the reach of the law, and even those rights
successfully established often do little to actually better women's lives because of
barriers to effective remedy, including the reluctance of conservative courts to
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dimensions of juridical analysis,2" and the prior arguments by several
justices that unequivocally and fervently contest constitutional theories
of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality."' Viewed in this
broad context, a conclusion that judicial insensitivity to gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender equality efforts influences the Dale decision
is neither implausible nor unreasonable." 6
V CREATING AN ExPRESSIvE ASSOCIATION JURISPRUDENCE THAT
RESPECTS LIBERTY AND EQUALITY
The foregoing analysis unveils how Dale diminishes judicial
sensitivity toward equality and makes an artificial and destructive
distinction between outness and sexual identity. This Article now
offers some suggestions for creating an expressive association
jurisprudence that does not disparage equality or liberty and for
constructing an equality discourse that does not bifurcate sexual
enforce the law. After the first flush of legal victories for sex equality in the 1970s,
feminist lawyers and advocates suddenly found themselves in the 1980s struggling
in the courts and legislatures simply to retain baseline rights for women. In the
hostile political climate of the past decade, visionary efforts to transform society
through law began to appear increasingly-and perhaps foolishly-naive.
Jane E. Larson, Introduction: Third Wave-Can Feminists Use the Law to Effect Social
Change in the 1990s?, 87 Nw. U L. REV 1252, 1253 (1993) (footnote omitted); see also
GmARDEAu A. SPANN, RACE AGAiNST THE COuRT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 3 (1993) ("The inevitability of Supreme Court review is likely to
have an adverse effect on minority interests because the Supreme Court has been structured
to operate in a manner that is inherently conservative .... [T]he Court's inherent
conservatism impairs minority efforts to achieve racial equality?'); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, The Social Construction of Brown v. Board of Education: Law Reform and the
Reconstructive Paradox, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547, 568 (1995) ("[R]eformers should
hesitate to place much faith in the legal system as the primary instrument for their agendas.
Law is relatively powerless to effect social revolutions as both theory and history ...
demonstrate.'); Linda S. Greene, Race in the 21st Century: Equality through Law?, 64 TUL.
L. REv. 1515, 1540-41 (1990) (arguing that "it may be necessary to ask whether the
confinement of the movement for racial equality to civil rights litigation exposes the
movement to great risk" and that such a strategy might not only compromise the achievement
of"meaningful equality" but could also diminish "the very legitimacy of alternate avenues to
racial justice").
284. See supra notes 272-281 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 234-266 and accompanying text.
286. The trial court was far more open in expressing its hostility to gays and lesbians.
For example, to determine that the Boy Scouts in fact had an expressive interest in
condemning homosexuality, the court discusses the (irrelevant) biblical story of "Sodom and
Gomorrah" and finds that "[i]n the Judeo-Christian tradition the act of sodomy has always
been considered a gravely serious moral wrong' Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., No. MON-C-
330-92, slip op. at 193A (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Nov. 3, 1995) (emphasis added) (on file
with Tulane Law Review). The court also described Dale as an "active sodomist,' and held,
citing to the Bible and criminal proscriptions of sodomy, that the suggestion that the Boy
Scouts "had no policy against active homosexuality is nonsense?' Id. at 194A-195A.
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identity and expression. This Section first argues that the Court should
apply reasonable evidentiary requirements for discriminators in
litigation challenging application of civil rights laws by returning to the
spirit of the Roberts methodology and conducting a more
"substantial'" rather than deferential, review of the record in these
cases. This Section closes by encouraging the Court to consider the
role of speech in the formation and maintenance of identity and the
negative impact that its disaggregation of expression and identity has
upon the attainment of equality.
A. Redeploying the Spirit of the Roberts Framework
The Roberts doctrine treated equality and expression as
important goals. To achieve a balance between these compelling
institutional and individual interests, Roberts created only a narrow
avenue for state interference with associational rights, but the decision
also demanded clear evidence from discriminating associations to
substantiate the content of their expressive purposes and to prove that
admitting an unwanted member into the organization would impede
these protected speech interests." The Dale decision silently backs
away from this doctrine, formally applying the Roberts framework, but
also holding that it must defer to discriminators in their efforts to prove
an expressive association defense against civil rights enforcement."'
This deference doctrine has severe implications for civil rights
enforcement. Unless courts carefully investigate and actively review
the evidentiary record, expressive association jurisprudence will
ultimately permit invidious discrimination in places of public
accommodation even when such discrimination does not realistically
further any speech interests of the members of the organization.
Accordingly, the deferential standard will make it easier for defendants
to "constitutionalize" their invidious discrimination through pretextual
First Amendment claims. Furthermore, according deference to private
civil rights defendants, especially admitted discriminators, has no
precedential analogue. While the Court has given Congress deference
to discriminate in certain contexts, it has never explicitly afforded other
discriminators such dramatic leeway to discriminate on the basis of
prohibited classifications or against protected classes unless clear,
countervailing constitutional interests warrant such latitude."'
287. See supra Part II.B.3.
288. See Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647-48 (2000); see supra Part n.C.
289. See supra notes 145-148 and accompanying text.
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1. Courts Should "Substantially" Review Evidence in
Antidiscrimination Cases
In order to pay sufficient attention to the compelling goal of
equality, to accord respect to actual and legitimate expressive interests,
and to adhere to traditional equality precedent, the Court should
redeploy the constitutional and evidentiary standards of the Roberts
line of cases. The Roberts standard requires both plaintiffs and
defendants in discrimination cases to prove that liberty and equality
clearly matter in antidiscrimination cases.9' Furthermore, while the
actual analysis in Roberts may have gone too far in not recognizing the
potential socially constructed differences between men and women,
the ultimate reasoning of the decision was quite sound because the
overwhelming evidence demonstrated that the Jaycees' speech and
activities were not gender-based. Hence, the group's expression did
not relate to its sex discrimination. 9'
In order to guard against the erosion of equality that Dale
portends, this Article suggests the following standard: if, after a
substantial, rather than deferential, review of the evidentiary record, the
facts in antidiscrimination cases demonstrate that a nexus exists
between an association's discrimination and its clear speech interest,
then the group will have satisfied the requirements of Roberts."2 This
standard is consistent with the Roberts doctrine's careful evidentiary
analysis and, therefore, offers a legitimate alternative to the unfounded,
passive framework adopted in Dale. In order to conduct a substantial
review of the evidence pertaining to an expressive association defense
in antidiscrimination cases, the Court should actively, rather than
slothfully, consider the credibility and sufficiency of such evidence,
particularly when it consists entirely of post-litigation statements,
ambiguous and conflicting documents and testimony, and when the
party experiencing discrimination has historically suffered from
discrimination that is unrelated to any particular social or policy goal.
290. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622-24 (1984); see supra Part
II.B.
291. See supra notes 73-101 and accompanying text.
292. This Article uses "substantial" to denote a significant, full, whole, and active-
rather than passive, deferential, and fleeting-evidentiary analysis. The term is not meant to
implicate the "substantial evidence" test utilized in administrative proceedings. See
Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 US. 156, 168 (1962) (finding that an
administrative agency "must make findings that support its decision, and those findings must
be supported by substantial evidence").
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2. The Substantial Review of Evidence in Dale Fails to Justify
Discrimination
In Dale, the Court credits the Boy Scouts' expressive association
defense by finding that post-litigation statements, conflicting data, and
amorphous slogans embody a heterosexist viewpoint. 3 While post-
litigation statements are not necessarily inadmissible or irrelevant, the
Court should have considered, given the compelling legal and social
goal of equality, whether such statements advanced by the Boy Scouts
actually served as a post hoe construction of ideology, rather than an
expression of the organization's actual expressive purposes.
In addition, the evidence in the record is conflicting. While the
Boy Scouts fervently argues that its exclusion of Dale relates to the
organization's "heterosexist" expression, the group had made no effort
to exclude heterosexuals who disagree with heterosexism"' The
disparate treatment of openly pro-gay heterosexuals on the one hand
and out gay males on the other suggests that the Boy Scouts' speech
defense is pretextual. If the organization truly disapproves of
nonheterosexual intimacy, then it would exclude anyone who openly
expresses approval of gay and lesbian equality. The organization's
failure to censor consistently pro-gay "speech" suggests that its
discrimination simply furthers invidious discrimination, rather than a
constitutionally protected expressive interest. 5
Furthermore, Dale's membership in a socially subordinate class
gives rise to the logical suspicion that his inclusion in the Boy Scouts
would not actually impair the organization's mission. Given the legacy
of historical and present-day discrimination, an organization will
probably have a greater tendency to invent an "expressive" purpose for
its discrimination when its exclusion targets socially subordinate
classes. The history of irrelevant discrimination on the basis of race,
gender, sexual identity, religion, and disabled statuses counsels against
a deferential and passive analysis of defenses in public accommoda-
tions litigation. 6 Instead, the Court should engage in a more
293. See supra Part H.C.
294. See Dale, 530 US. at 655-56; supra notes 210-214 and accompanying text.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 210-214.
296. This argument is drawn from the often-neglected concern for applying heightened
scrutiny to gender classifications expressed in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero
v: Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion). Justice Brennan justified heightened
scrutiny in the context of gender discrimination because gender is often irrelevant to social
policy:
[W]hat differentiates sex from such nonsuspect statuses as intelligence or physical
disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex
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substantial analysis that "smokes out" illegitimate discrimination,
such as discrimination in places of public accommodation that does
not relate to or pursue a clear expressive purpose of the organizations.
While the Court should not require organizations to document every
expressive goal in writing-for example, a group may sincerely want
to exclude or disassociate from serial murderers even if it does not
inscribe this position in its bylaws-the Court has the obligation to
ensure that its analysis does not legitimize invidious discrimination
that is unconnected to expression. 9' Of course, the history of
oppression and prejudice may actually serve as an organizing point for
some institutions, both supportive of, and opposed to, such practices.
29
Requiring associations in those situations to express openly and clearly
their speech does not injure freedom of expression. Instead, a
substantial evidentiary review simply ensures that the organization
does not perpetuate social inequality absent some actual constitutional
basis for doing so.
Applying these standards to the facts in Dale complicates the Boy
Scouts' expressive association defense. The organization relies solely
on ambiguous, conflicting, and post-litigation evidence, and it does not
demonstrate that heterosexuality and heterosexism relate to its
educational and recreational activities.3" Furthermore, the organization
actually permits the participation of heterosexuals who speak out
against heterosexism, but it excludes gays and lesbians who are merely
open about their sexual identity."' This disparate treatment strongly
suggests that the Boy Scouts' heterosexist stance does not relate to any
"message" but is instead a mere discriminatory practice. Additionally,
the historical subordination of sexual minorities on grounds that are
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society. As a result, statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of
invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal status without
regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members.
Id. at 686-87 (footnote omitted). See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvmw 150 (1980) (arguing that the plurality of the Court embraces
relevance but not the immutability rationale in Frontiero).
297. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 US. 200, 226 (1995) (arguing that
the "purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race").
298. See Dale, 530 US. at 700 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court must
guard against the harm of social prejudice).
299. This is the critical difference between governments and "private" entities in my
analysis; many forms of prejudice cannot serve as the basis for governmental policy without
sufficient justification.
300. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-50; supra Part ll.C.
301. See Dale, 530 US. at 655-56; supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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irrelevant to the achievement of any legitimate social policy3 2 suggests
that the Boy Scouts' exclusion of gay males might not relate to any of
the various activities of the organization. While groups can certainly
associate to express their agreement with social subordination and can
disassociate from the targets of such subordination to effectuate their
prejudice, courts should carefully consider whether members of the
organization actually unite for the purpose of promoting bigotry.
Given the utter lack of any clear evidence in the record demonstrating
antigay expression by the Boy Scouts or establishing a nexus between
homophobic discrimination and the activities of scouting,3 3 the Court
should have rejected the Boy Scouts' expressive association defense.
Instead, by developing a standard that accords extreme deference to
discriminating organizations, the Court has widely expanded the body
of constitutionally permissible discrimination against subordinate
classes and has done so in the absence of any countervailing
constitutional interest.
B. Toward the 'Accommodation of Outness" in Equality
Jurisprudence
The Court must also recognize the importance of expressive
activities in the forming and sustaining of social identity. In Dale (and
Hurley), the Court makes an inaccurate and damaging distinction
between discrimination on the basis of "sexual identity" and on
account of "outness"; the two categories are, in fact, inseparable due to
the socially constructed nature of identity. °4 The Court, however, treats
identity as a biological phenomenon that exists apart from any
expression or conduct."' Because speech and identity are inherently
connected, the Court's disaggregation of speech and identity
legitimates class-based discrimination against gay, lesbian, bisexual,
and transgender individuals. This outcome conflicts with the Court's
302. As Elvia Rosales Arriola has argued in the context of equal protection
jurisprudence:
There are no convincing reasons why an evolving equal protection doctrine cannot
include sexual orientation as a constitutionally irrelevant trait and protect gay men
and lesbians as a "discrete and insular" minority. Under the current implications of
the equal protection doctrine the claim of discrimination on the basis of sexual
identity mandates suspect class inquiries on the part of reviewing courts.
Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a
Discrete and Insular Minority, 14 WOmEN'S RTs. L. REP. 263, 279 (1992) (footnote omitted).
303. See supra notes 103-148 and accompanying text.
304. See supra Part LJL.B.
305. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 644-50; supra Part IM.A.
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own conclusion that Dale's mere "membership in a particular class"
would not prove the Boy Scouts' defense.3" More importantly, the
bifurcation of speech and identity has dramatic implications for the
broader body of equality jurisprudence.
The Court's evolving doctrine on sexual identity offers a hollow
version of equality that conditions civil rights protection on the
silencing of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals. The
Court's treatment of outness discrimination as a permissible form of
discrimination, distinct from class-based discrimination, would allow
defendants in a host of litigation contexts to escape the application of
civil rights statutes or to evade constitutional equality guarantees by
simply framing their policies as excluding "avowed homosexuals" '
rather than as mistreating gays and lesbians "as such' 3 " Furthermore,
when viewed together with the new deference accorded to defendants
in public accommodations cases, the Court's separation of identity and
speech could provide discriminators with a virtual "green light" to
discriminate. Once a gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender individual
openly expresses his or her sexual identity, the discriminator need only
point to an amorphous and previously "concealed" heterosexist
viewpoint in order to raise a successful expressive association defense
and prevail in civil rights litigation." Thus, the Court's analysis
severely erodes protection of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
litigants and undermines the compelling social and legal goal of
equality.
1. Accommodating Outness
In order to actualize the principles of civil and social equality, the
Court must discard its artificial distinction between outness and sexual
identity and treat outness discrimination as an impermissible form of
status-based discrimination (unless, of course, it is justified by a clear,
countervailing, constitutional interest, such as expressive association).
The central role of expression in identity formation belies the Court's
effort to dichotomize expression and status.
306. See supra notes 149-162 and accompanying text.
307. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-56 (justifying the Boy Scouts' discrimination against
Dale on the basis of his status as an "avowed homosexual").
308. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 572
(1995) (making the distinction between discrimination against "homosexuals as such" and
discrimination on the basis of their expression).
309. See supra Part III.C.3.
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A jurisprudence that "accommodates outness" does not insulate a
discriminator's exclusion of a gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender
individual on the sole ground that the victim has expressed openly his
or her sexual (or gender) identity.1 While a legitimate speech interest
could certainly outweigh even an expressive identity equality claim,
Dale and Hurley, if strictly construed, would leave no room for treating
outness discrimination as a transgression from principles of equality,
regardless of the doctrinal context in which the discrimination occurs.
Instead, Dale and Hurley leave the impression that expression and
identity are physically and doctrinally distinct."' As a result, the Court
has begun to construct a jurisprudence that does not accommodate
claims of outness discrimination; this embryonic jurisprudence
threatens gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender equality and
conditions civil rights protection on the silencing of sexual
minorities."' The inextricable connection between outness and identity
counsels against adherence to such a narrow equality doctrine.
2. Outness Discrimination and Expressive Association
The fact that expression constitutes and constructs identity does
not preclude a finding that the forced inclusion of an "avowed"
member of a class into an organization would complicate its expressive
goals. Rather, an association may have a valid constitutional interest in
excluding members of a class who would interfere with or impede its
clear expressive activities."' Under this standard, however, the Boy
Scouts should not have prevailed in Dale because the group did not
establish a clear expressive interest in heterosexist discrimination. 4 If
the Boy Scouts had in fact demonstrated, after a substantial review of
the evidence, that the condemnation of homosexuality was a part of its
mission, then the organization's expressive association defense would
have been more compelling. Dale's exclusion under these
circumstances would have still constituted class-based discrimination,
but it would have been justified by a countervailing constitutional
interest-the right of expressive association. Thus, this Article's
primary dispute with Dale's implication for speech-equality conflicts
centers largely around the Court's lowering of the evidentiary
310. See Hutchinson, supra note 23, at 124 (arguing that courts should "accommodate
outness" in equality jurisprudence).
311. See supra notes 149-189 and accompanying text.
312. See supra Part I.C.
313. See supra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
314. See supra Part II.C.
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requirements for antidiscrimination defendants and its mischaracteri-
zation of the nature of the Boy Scouts' exclusion as expression rather
than identity. The evidentiary shift opens the door to pretextual speech
defenses, while the separation of speech and identity distorts the reality
of identity construction and, if strictly applied, expands permissible
discrimination in cases that do not implicate First Amendment
concerns.
315
Even when organizations can demonstrate that they have a clear
expressive interest in supporting heterosexism, courts should
nevertheless, consider whether outness inevitably and perpetually
communicates an unwanted message and whether an openly gay or
lesbian individual causes actual harm to the organization's speech. In
the normal situation, an organization that takes a clear, collective
position supporting the subordination of, or prejudice against, a
protected class would have little difficulty, even under a substantial
evidentiary review, proving that inclusion of a member of that class
would impair the group's expression.'1 The factual context of Dale,
however, precludes such a summary result. The record indicates that
the Boy Scouts does not expel heterosexuals who voice open
disagreement with heterosexism. The openly pro-gay "viewpoint" of
heterosexuals, like the "message" communicated by an out gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender person, conflicts with and impairs the
effectuation of a heterosexist mission. The disparate treatment of pro-
gay heterosexuals and openly gay individuals suggests that the
organization does not actually exist to condemn homosexuality."1 7
With respect to the question of viewpoint impairment, the inclusion of
openly pro-gay heterosexuals in the Boy Scouts diminishes the
credibility of the group's claim that openly gay individuals would harm
its purportedly heterosexist expression. Once the organization
knowingly includes some individuals who openly challenge its
message within the organization, then its claim that the admission of
others in the group who "speak" the same or a similar message will
315. See supra Part Il.C.3.
316. See Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Mayor of Thurmont,
700 F Supp. 281, 290-91 (D. Md. 1988) (holding that the Ku Klux Klan's decision to exclude
nonwhites and non-Christians from its parade is protected by the freedom of expressive
association). See also Neal E. Devins, The Trouble with Jaycees, 34 CATH. U. L. REv 901,
911-12 (1985) (arguing that "the Ku Klux Klan could invoke the first amendment in refusing
to admit blacks or Jews since much of the Klan's protected speech is directed at blacks or
Jews").
317. See supra notes 211-214 and accompanying text.
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impede its expression loses credibility."' A substantial review of the
evidence would treat these claims as suspicious and incredulous.
3. Recognizing Expression as Identity Does Not Harm Gay Rights
Efforts
This Article has argued that courts must recognize the expressive
dimensions of identity in order to preserve and enhance equality.
Acknowledging the active dimensions of identity, however, runs the
risk of legitimizing the subordination of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender individuals, for a harmful discourse that conflates sexual
identity and behavior has justified the exclusion of queer individuals
from the promises of equality. This dangerous conflation of identity
and behavior has occurred in equal protection cases challenging
heterosexist governmental discrimination. Specifically, several courts
and litigants have invoked the Hardiwick decision in equal protection
cases, arguing that "sodomy" defines the class of "homosexuals" and
because governments can constitutionally criminalize 'homosexual
sodomy" then no one could reasonably contend that heterosexist
discrimination violates the Constitution."' In response to the juridical
conflation of sexual conduct and sexual identity, many antiheterosexist
commentators and jurists have endeavored to distinguish homosexual
"status" and "conduct," conceding that governments can penalize and
regulate the latter and arguing that they should not discriminate on the
basis of the former."' This Article seemingly contradicts this pro-gay
318. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 627 (1984) (discounting
association's claim that the full membership of women would impair its speech because the
association already included women).
319. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 E2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (invoking
Hardwick to reject the argument that gays and lesbians constitute a quasi-suspect or suspect
class and holding, "[I]f the Court was unwilling to object to state laws that criminalize the
behavior that defines the class, it is hardly open to a lower court to conclude that state
sponsored discrimination against the class is invidious"); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
600, 640-41 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that Hardwick is "most relevant" to
deciding the equal protection question in Romer). But see Watkins v. United States Army,
847 E2d 1329, 1340 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 875 E2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)
(rejecting argument that Hardwick precludes a finding that gays and lesbians constitute a
quasi-suspect class because "nothing in Hardwick suggests that the state may penalize gays
for their sexual orientation" or "holds that the state may make invidious distinctions when
regulating sexual conduct"); Sunstein, supra note 262, at 1171-78 (criticizing the argument
that Hardiwick precludes application of equal protection principles to invalidate antigay laws
because due process legitimates traditional norms, while equal protection marks a departure
from such norms).
320. See, e.g., Cain, supra note 233, at 1617 (observing that gay and lesbian civil
rights litigants have developed a strategy of "litigat[ing] around" Hardwick by making a
distinction between status and conduct); Taylor Flynn, Of Communism, Treason, and
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effort to construct a tight boundary between status and conduct
because it conceives of identity as a nonclinical, active, and expressive
phenomenon. Thus, this Article may invite and reinforce arguments
that conflate sexual identity and sexual conduct in order to contest
equal protection for sexual minorities. For the following reasons,
however, this Article does not legitimize the doctrinal invocation of
Hardwick and sexual conduct in the context of equal protection
adjudication to justify heterosexist discrimination.
First, Hardwick was wrongly decided. Many commentators have
criticized the narrow due process analysis applied in the case. 2'
Moreover, the decision perpetuates and legitimizes homophobia and
applies an extremely cramped vision of liberty." Because Hardwick is
doctrinally flawed and stands as an expression of judicial homophobia,
it should not govern equal protection cases.
Furthermore, when courts conflate gay and lesbian identity with
sodomy, they narrowly construct gays and lesbians as a class of
"sodomites." While sexual identity certainly involves sexual intimacy
and practice, there are other dimensions that define and construct
sexuality.23 Speech, association, politics, outness, and other "conduct"
also define the class of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
individuals. 2' Using this broader lens to define sexual identity
complicates the reductionist equal protection jurisprudence that
equates gayness with sodomy in order to constitutionalize heteroseist
discrimination. Because queer identity consists of much more than
sexual practice, the continued existence of Hardwick does not preclude
heightened scrutiny of governmental heterosexism.
Addiction: An Evaluation of Novel Challenges to the Military Anti-Gay Policy, 80 IOWA L.
REV 979, 979 (1995) (noting that some litigants challenging the military's antigay and lesbian
discrimination have distinguished homosexual sexual conduct from gay and lesbian status);
Jonathan Pickhardt, Note, Choose or Loose: Embracing Theories of Choice in Gay Rights
Litigation Strategies, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv 921, 931 (1998) (noting that gay and lesbian rights
lawyers have embraced a distinction between status and conduct in equal protection litigation
in order to overcome the Hardwick decision).
321. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
322. See id.
323. Nan D. Hunter, Life after Hardwick, 27 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 531, 543 (1992)
(arguing that the conflation of gay and lesbian identity with sodomy "is premised on a radical
imbalance" under which "[t]he act of homosexual sodomy 'defines the class' of gay men and
lesbians"); Lori J. Rankin, Comment, Ballot Initiatives and Gay Rights: Equal Protection
Challenges to the Rights Campaign Against Lesbians and Gay Men, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 1055,
1070-71 (1994) (criticizing invocation of Hardwick in the equal protection context because
"engaging in sexual activity is simply one aspect of humanity and is generally a means for
expressing emotional affinity").
324. See supra Part III.B.2.
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In addition, as several commentators have argued, the invocation
of Hardwick in the equal protection context might confuse the
constitutional roles of equal protection and substantive due process.
Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that equal protection seeks to break
away from tradition by eradicating subjugation and providing
protection for historically oppressed classes, while substantive due
process looks to tradition in order to construe what rights the Court
should deem "fundamental.*'3" While courts engaging in a
"traditional" due process analysis should not constrain themselves
solely to the past or to the narrowest definitions of history,3 6 Sunstein's
analysis provides a useful framework for understanding the
constitutional roles of equal protection and due process and for
responding to the judicial invocation of Hardwick in the context of
equal protection litigation?"
Finally, the status/conduct distinction that many gay and lesbian
rights advocates embrace is itself fundamentally flawed. On some
level, the distinction is an understandable, if not a predictable, litigation
strategy, given the usage of Hardwick to restrict gay and lesbian
equality efforts and the history of conflating gays and lesbians with
sex. 32 Yet, the status/conduct distinction harms gay and lesbian
equality because it, as does Dale's dissection of identity and speech,
situates equality upon a narrow and artificial premise: the faulty
notion that sexual identity is a fixed, sterile, clinical, and biological
quantity that is separable from expression or action.' 9 Gay and lesbian
325. See Sunstein supra note 262, at 1171-78 (criticizing the argument that Hardwick
precludes the application of equal protection principles to invalidate antigay laws because due
process legitimates traditional norms, while equal protection marks a departure from such
norms).
326. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 848 (1992)
("Neither the Bill of Rights nor the specific practices of States at the time of the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment marks the outer limits of the substantive sphere of liberty which
the Fourteenth Amendment protects:'); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the narrow reliance upon history and tradition in
substantive due process jurisprudence); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that courts should rely on tradition in construing fundamental liberties
but concluding that "tradition is a living thing"' (emphasis added)); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L. REV
1183 (2000) (advancing a more fluid approach to equal protection and due process than
Sunstein).
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1185-86 (criticizing Sunstein approach).
328. See Fajer, supra note 165, at 550 (arguing that social stereotypes imagine gays
and lesbians as "empty and promiscuous, devoid of love, warmth, commitment, or stability").
329. See Halley supra note 255, at 438 ("Of course it is rational to say that
homosexuals-real homosexuals, professed homosexuals, or people designated by others as
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litigative acquiescence in the status/conduct distinction tacitly (and, at
times, openly) legitimizes discrimination against gay and lesbian
conduct, when such conduct actually defines and constructs sexual
identity.3" Equal protection of gay and lesbian "status" but not lived
experiences (including sexual intimacy and outness) is an empty form
of equality.
To the extent that this Article contradicts a gay rights litigation
strategy grounded upon the cementing of boundaries between status
and conduct, then this Article imagines a broader, more substantive
form of equality than this well-intentioned, yet flawed, strategy implies.
The concept of expressive and active identity portends a more
protective equality doctrine, which does not insulate outness discrimi-
nation from civil rights enforcement (absent countervailing constitu-
tional interests) or marginalize the critical role of speech (and other
conduct) in the construction of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
identities and in the pursuit of a society free of heterosexism.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE BOY SCOUTS "COMES OUT"
In the wake of the Court's decision in Dale, municipalities,
private citizens, and nonprofit organizations around the country have
started to rethink and renounce their relations with the Boy Scouts. 3'
homosexuals for good conventional reasons-are more likely to engage in homosexual
sodomy than everyone else."); Hunter, supra note 323, at 545 ("The weakness of the status-
centered view is its erasure of all conduct and its focus solely on identity"); Diane H. Mazur,
The Unknown Soldier. A Critique of "Gays in the Military" Scholarship and Litigation, 29
U.C. DAvis L. REv 223, 237-38 (1996) (arguing that the status/conduct distinction is
"demeaning" to gays and lesbians because it legitimates stigmatization of same-gender sexual
intimacy); id at 239-40 (arguing that the status-conduct distinction is "factually absurd"
because it requires gays and lesbians to claim celibacy).
330. See Mazur, supra note 329, at 23549 (criticizing the status/conduct distinction).
331. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Jewish Group Recommends Cutting Ties to Boy
Scouts: A Protest Against the Ban on Gay Members, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2001. at A12
(reporting that the Reform Jewish leadership has recommended that its congregants and
synagogues sever ties with the Boy Scouts); Anemona Hartocollis, Levy Limits Scout Events
in the Schools: Says Bias Against Gays Violates Board Policy, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 2, 2000, at
BI (reporting that New York City schools have prohibited some of the Boy Scouts' usage of
school facilities due to its antigay policies); Interior Dept. Reviews Ties With Boy Scouts,
N.Y TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2000, at Al 8 (reporting that the Department of Interior is evaluating its
ties with the Boy Scouts in light of Dale); Eric Lipton, Local Scouting Board Calling Gay
Ban 'Stupid' Urges End to National Policy, N.Y Tu Es, Feb. 27, 2001, at B3 (reporting that
chapters of New York City-area Boy Scouts are calling for an end to the organization's antigay
policy); Richard Weizel, In Hopes of Reviving Donations: A Pamphle4 N.Y TIMES, Feb. 11,
2001, at C3 (reporting institutional and individual opposition to the Boy Scouts' antigay ban);
Kate Zemike, Scouts'Successful Ban on Gays Is Followed by Loss in Support: Gifts are Cut
and Public Property Use Limited, N.Y TmEs, Aug. 29, 2000, at Al (reporting the national
withdrawal of financial support from the Boy Scouts as a result of Dale).
BOY SCOUTS v. DALE
Thus, the Boy Scouts' pressing of an associational right to engage in
homophobic discrimination has, ironically, caused many individuals
and institutions affiliated with the Boy Scouts to disassociate from the
organization.32 These post-Dale developments speak to the power of
having one's speech placed in the market place of ideas. An open
position that embraces homophobia may have negative consequences
in a society that attaches some value to formal equality, inasmuch as
outness subjects queer individuals to subjugation in heteronormative
cultures. Yet, Dales negative impact upon the Boy Scouts says more
about the illegitimacy of the organization's expressive association
defense that it successfully advanced in the litigation. The sudden
move by governments, institutions, and individuals to sever ties with
the Boy Scouts proves that the organization really did not possess a
"clear" (and certainly not a widely known) expressive interest in
excluding gay males from the organization prior to the Dale decision.
In postmodernist fashion, the Dale decision socially constructs the Boy
Scouts as a heterosexist organization with a constitutional interest in
prejudicial exclusion. Understandably, the Boy Scouts "true"
philosophy has shocked and angered many of the sponsors and
members of the organization.33 Now, propelled out of the closet by the
Dale litigation, the Boy Scouts is "flaunting" its new homophobic
identity by expressing its disapproval of anyone, not just gays, who
voices an opinion that contests heterosexist discrimination." Thus,
while Dale reinforces the closet for sexually transgressive individuals,
it outs the Boy Scouts as a heterosexist speaker in a national discourse
on sexual morality.
The Supreme Court, however, does not have a constitutional
responsibility to construct the content of a discriminating association's
speech. Instead, in cases such as Dale, the Court has the obligation to
determine, after a careful review of the evidentiary record, whether the
organization's preexisting philosophy and activities constitutionalize its
exclusionary practices. In Dale, the Court abandons this mission and
dramatically reduces the evidentiary requirements of an expressive
association defense. The Court also dichotomizes sexual identity and
expression, thus potentially justifying a wide range of heterosexist
332. See, e.g., supra note 331 and accompanying text.
333. Seeid
334. See Scout Groups RejectedAfler Fighting Gay Policy, N.Y TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2001,
§ 1, at 16 (reporting that the Boy Scouts has expelled seven sponsors who oppose antigay ban
and that these groups "vere believed to be among the first to lose their charters because of
the policy").
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discrimination. If the Court ever hopes to achieve a balance in the
protection of speech and equality claims, which are at the same time
related, conflicting, and intertwined, it must first dismantle its newly
minted deference standard and conduct a substantial, rather than
passive, review of the evidence in speech-equality litigation.
Furthermore, the Court should discard its strained and artificial
disaggregation of expression and identity in order to ensure that gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals and other oppressed
classes receive substantive equal protection. Adherence to the
jurisprudence announced in Dale can only secure and deliver a shallow
equality-an "equality" founded, contradictorily, upon silence and
prejudice.
